International Crisis Group Report No 131-2007

DISCORD IN PAKISTAN’S NORTHERN AREAS
Asia Report N°131 – 2 April 2007
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................... i
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................... 1
II. THE HISTORY............................................................................................................... 2
A. THE KASHMIR CONNECTION..................................................................................................2
B. ACCEDING TO PAKISTAN .......................................................................................................3
III. SIX DECADES OF CONSTITUTIONAL NEGLECT ................................................... 5
A. RETAINING THE KASHMIR CONNECTION ................................................................................5
1. Justification ................................................................................................................5
2. Enforcement ...............................................................................................................6
B. THE NORTHERN AREAS AND AJK:DIVERGENT PATHS...........................................................7
1. Constitutional and administrative development .............................................................7
2. Azad Jammu and Kashmir..........................................................................................8
3. The Northern Areas ....................................................................................................8
C. THE LEGAL DIMENSION.......................................................................................................10
IV. POLITICAL DISEMPOWERMENT ......................................................................... 11
A. CENTRALISED CONTROL......................................................................................................11
B. LEGISLATIVE IMPOTENCE ....................................................................................................12
C. POLITICAL MANIPULATION..................................................................................................12
D. JUDICIAL DEPENDENCE........................................................................................................13
E. RIGHTS VERSUS DEVELOPMENT ..........................................................................................14
V. THE SECTARIAN MENACE ..................................................................................... 15
A. ORIGINS OF SECTARIAN STRIFE............................................................................................15
1. Zia-ul-Haq and state-sponsored sectarianism............................................................15
B. DYNAMICS OF THE SECTARIAN DIVIDE ................................................................................17
1. The textbook issue....................................................................................................17
2. Restoring the peace ..................................................................................................18
VI. ALTERING THE STATUS QUO................................................................................ 20
A. THE NATIONALIST CHALLENGE ...........................................................................................20
B. OPTIONS FOR THE NORTHERN AREAS...................................................................................20
VII. CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................. 21
APPENDICES
A. MAP OF PAKISTAN ..............................................................................................................22
B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................23
C. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA ....................................24
D. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES.........................................................26
Asia Report N°131 2 April 2007
DISCORD IN PAKISTAN’S NORTHERN AREAS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Almost six decades after Pakistan’s independence, the
constitutional status of the Federally Administered Northern
Areas (Gilgit and Baltistan), once a part of the former
princely state of Jammu and Kashmir and now under
Pakistani control, remains undetermined, with political
autonomy a distant dream. The region’s inhabitants are
embittered by Islamabad’s unwillingness to devolve power
to its elected representatives, and a nationalist movement,
which seeks independence, is gaining ground. The rise of
sectarian extremism is an alarming consequence of this
denial of basic political rights. Taking advantage of
the weaknesses in the imposed dispensation, religious
organisations espousing a narrow sectarian agenda are
fanning the fires of sectarian hatred in a region where
Sunnis, Shias and Ismailis have peacefully coexisted for
several centuries.
Prior to Pakistan’s independence, the Northern Areas were
part of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir and a key
component of Imperial India’s strategic northern frontier. In
1947, the region successfully rebelled against the Maharaja
of Kashmir and supported full integration into Pakistan.
Almost 60 years later, Pakistan’s military, the arbiter of
its Kashmir policy, insists that the Northern Areas remain
part of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir and that
any delineation of the region’s constitutional status will
have to wait for a solution of the Kashmir dispute. As a
result, the Northern Areas are not included in the Pakistan
constitution and, unlike the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA), are not represented in the parliament. The
region has been left in a constitutional limbo.
Like the Northern Areas, Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK),
the other part of the former princely state under Pakistan’s
control, is also considered disputed territory. Yet, Islamabad
has granted AJK at least nominal autonomy, including
its own constitution. In stark contrast, it administers the
Northern Areas under the Legal Framework Order (LFO)
of 1994, an administrative instrument used to strengthen
its hold over the region while denying its residents basic
political and civil rights. Many locals believe sectarian bias
is behind the decision to maintain widely different political
arrangements to the Northern Areas and AJK. Unlike AJK,
which, like Pakistan, has an overwhelming Sunni majority,
the Northern Areas are the only Shia-majority region
under Pakistani control.
Violating a landmark verdict by the Pakistan Supreme Court
in 1999, which directed Islamabad to extend, within six
months, fundamental freedoms to the Northern Areas,
allowing its people to be governed by their elected
representatives, the region is still ruled by executive fiat
from Islamabad through the federal ministry for Kashmir
Affairs and Northern Areas (KANA), whose minister is its
unelected chief executive. The Northern Areas Legislative
Council (NALC), the region’s elected legislature, is
powerless, and civil and military bureaucrats run affairs.
By depriving elected institutions of even a modicum of
authority and marginalising moderate political forces,
Islamabad has empowered sectarian groups and allowed
them to secure a firm foothold in the region.
The military’s patronage of Sunni jihadis has also promoted
sectarian strife in the Northern Areas, first witnessed during
General Zia-ul-Haq’s rule (1977-1988), when the state
empowered Sunni Islamists at the cost of the Shia minority.
Since then, violent sectarian clashes have frequently
occurred in the Northern Areas. Under President and Army
Chief Pervez Musharraf, the military has retained its
alliance with Sunni Islamists for multiple goals, domestic
and external, further weakening moderate forces in a
region where religious extremism was once unknown.
Nor has the military government taken any meaningful
steps to address the wider issues of constitutional neglect
and political disempowerment in the Northern Areas.
With the denial of political space and basic rights under
Musharraf’s military government, discontent in the Northern
Areas is on the rise, and the political vacuum is being
exploited by extremist groups to promote their sectarian
goals. Implementing the recommendations of Pakistan’s
Supreme Court and extending basic rights and political
freedoms to the Northern Areas could restore some of the
goodwill frittered away by long mismanagement. For that
to happen, however, Pakistan itself must have a democratic
dispensation. Democratically-elected governments in
Islamabad have initiated whatever political development
has taken place in the Northern Areas. At least until there is
again such a government, Islamabad will resist devolving
any meaningful power to a region that is perceived as a
bargaining chip in its rivalry with India over Kashmir.
Islamabad/Brussels, 2 April 2007
Asia Report N°131 2 April 2007
DISCORD IN PAKISTAN’S NORTHERN AREAS
I. INTRODUCTION
The Pakistani military, the ultimate arbiter of the country’s
Kashmir policy,1 has kept the strategically sensitive
Federally Administered Northern Areas under central
control for fear that even a modicum of autonomy would
translate into political empowerment and demands for
self-governance. For almost 60 years, Pakistan has tied
political rights there and the larger issue of a constitutional
identity to resolution of the Kashmir dispute.
The northernmost tracts of Pakistan-administered Kashmir
and spanning 72,486 sq. km, the Northern Areas border
the Chinese province of Xinjiang to the north, Indianadministered
Jammu and Kashmir to the east, Pakistanadministered
Azad Jammu and Kashmir to the south
and Afghanistan and Central Asia, through the Wakhan
Corridor to the west. They are divided into six districts.
Gilgit region has four districts: Astore, Diamer, Ghizer
and Gilgit. Baltistan region has two: Ghangche and Skardu.
According to the most recent national census (1998),
the population – all Muslim – was 870,347 but it is
now estimated at 1.5 million.2 Gilgit is the political and
administrative headquarters; other important areas include
Skardu, the headquarters of the army’s Northern Light
Infantry (NLI) regiment, and Diamer district, a citadel of
Sunni orthodoxy in an otherwise Shia-majority region.3
1 On the military’s control over the formulation and implementation
of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy, see Crisis Group Asia Report
N°35, Kashmir: Confrontation and Miscalculation, 11 July
2002; Crisis Group Asia Report N°68, Kashmir: The View from
Islamabad, 4 December 2003; Crisis Group Asia Report N°70,
Kashmir: Learning from the Past, 4 December 2003; and Crisis
Group Asia Report N°79, India/Pakistan Relations and Kashmir:
Steps Towards Peace, 24 June 2004.
2 M. Ismail Khan, “Justice needed with or without chief”,
The News, 13 March 2007.
3 The people of Diamer, like the Afghan Taliban, follow the
militantly puritanical Deobandi school of Sunni Islam. For more
on the origins, tenets and political/sectarian dynamics of the
Deobandi sect, see Crisis Group Asia Report N°95, The State of
Sectarianism in Pakistan, 18 April 2005. The division between
Shias and Sunnis dates to the death of the Prophet Mohammed
in 632 and the question of who was to take over leadership of
the Muslim community. Sunnis revere the first four caliphs
(Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman and Ali) as the legitimate Caliphs;
For almost two decades, the Northern Areas have been
afflicted by sectarianism; in recent years Shia-Sunni
violence has increased markedly. In 2005 alone, almost
100 people died, many more were injured, and property
worth millions of rupees was destroyed. Even more
harmful was the long-term damage to social harmony.
An atmosphere of fear, hatred and suspicion pervades
Gilgit, the main city, which has borne the brunt of sectarian
turmoil. If the immediate catalyst of the 2005 violence
was a dispute over the Islamic curriculum in school
textbooks, the real causes of sectarian conflict are to be
found in six decades of Pakistani misrule.
Instead of making Pakistan’s grip on the Northern Areas
more secure, the denial of basic rights and representative
institutions through which to express grievances has led
many, particularly youth, to turn in frustration to radical
sectarian groups. “The denial of rights has created
bitterness, frustration and resentment, emotions that have
found an outlet through bigotry and fanaticism”, said a
young politician in Gilgit.4 The military’s reliance on
Sunni jihadi groups to fight its proxy wars in Afghanistan
and Kashmir has made the Northern Areas, geographically
contiguous to Indian-administered Kashmir, a base and
training ground for Sunni militants, fuelling in turn sectarian
tensions in the Shia-majority region.5
The sense of deprivation in the Northern Areas has also
manifested itself, albeit less violently, in a nationalist
movement that could potentially challenge Pakistan’s
control over the territory. The military government has
chosen to counter discord and discontent not through
debate and reform but through brutal suppression.6
Shias reject the first three (along with the institution of the
caliphate) and maintain that Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet,
was not only his rightful heir but also the first of twelve divinely
inspired Imams, the last of whom went into hiding and will
return to usher in the end of the world. Ibid.
4 Crisis Group interview, Bashir Ahmed Khan, General
Secretary, Northern Areas Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-i-
Azam) [PML-Q], Islamabad, July 2006.
5 Crisis Group Report, The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan,
op. cit.
6 Nationalist parties complain of government harassment of
their workers, including implicating hundreds in false sedition
cases. Crisis Group interviews, Northern Areas nationalist
leaders, Gilgit, August 2006, and Islamabad, December 2006.
Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas
Crisis Group Asia Report N°131, 2 April 2007 Page 2
This report identifies the causes of conflict in the Northern
Areas. Examining their history as part of British India’s
northern frontier and their association with the former
princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, it analyses the
implications of Pakistan’s policy of linking constitutional
and political status to a resolution of the Kashmir dispute.
Examining the governance structures put in place by
Islamabad, it assesses the implications of political
disempowerment on political stability and sectarian
violence in the region.
II. THE HISTORY
A. THE KASHMIR CONNECTION
In 1846, the British sold the picturesque Vale of Kashmir,
situated in northern India and with an overwhelmingly
Muslim population, to Gulab Singh, the Hindu ruler of the
neighbouring Hindu-majority fiefdom of Jammu.7 Gulab
Singh had already annexed the Buddhist kingdom of
Ladakh in the 1830s and the predominantly Muslim
majority area of Baltistan in 1841. Over the next three
decades, he and his successors, with British support, erected
a mini-empire, penetrating the outermost reaches of India’s
northern frontier and establishing their suzerainty over what
was then referred to as Dardistan. 8 This predominantly
Muslim region included the former principalities of Gilgit,
Hunza, Nagar and other territories bordering on Chinese
Xinjiang and Afghanistan.
In 1846, a Boundary Commission was dispatched to
determine the frontier of the newly created state of Jammu
and Kashmir. Attention focused on the Ladakh and the
Gilgit routes.9 Because of the strategic location of this
territory, the British, concerned that a Russian advance
that could threaten their hold over India, were unwilling to
give the maharaja a free hand in conducting relations
with his neighbours. By the 1860s, Czarist Russia was
not only on the brink of establishing a common border
with Afghanistan but was also moving close to Chinese
7 A vassal of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, the founder of the Sikh
Empire in the Punjab, Gulab Singh remained neutral during
the first Anglo-Sikh War in 1846, facilitating British victory;
the British elevated him to Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir
under the Treaty of Amritsar of 1846.
8 The term “Dardistan” was coined by G. W. Leitner, an Anglo-
Hungarian orientalist who visited the Northern Areas in the
1860s and recorded his findings in Dardistan in 1866, 1886
and 1893 (Karachi, 1889/1985). Some experts believe he
erred by placing all tribes in the area into one category, the
Dards, ignoring their differences. For more on the Dards, see
John Mock, “Dards, Dardistan and Dardic: An Ethnographic,
Geographic and Linguistic Conundrum”, in Nigel J. R. Allan
(ed.), Pakistan: Karakoram Conquered (New York, 1996).
9 Imperial India’s northern frontier ran along the Karakoram
and its associated ranges, which created the primary watershed
between the Tarim Basin in Xinjiang and the Indus River. Two
major routes ran across this watershed, the Ladakh route in
the east into Xinjiang by way of the Karakoram Pass, and the
Gilgit route in the west from Gilgit through Hunza to Kashgar
in Xinjiang via the Khunjerab and other passes of the western
Karakoram range. Because of the Kashmir dispute, in 1947 the
northern frontier was partitioned. India acquired the Ladakh
route; the Gilgit route went to Pakistan and eventually evolved
into the Karakoram Highway. This highway, the world’s highest
paved international road, links Pakistan with China.
Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas
Crisis Group Asia Report N°131, 2 April 2007 Page 3
Turkestan.10 British policies towards India’s northern
frontier, therefore, were shaped until Pakistan and India’s
independence in 1947 by the need to thwart Moscow’s
expansionism.
The British believed that Gulab Singh’s son and successor
as maharaja, Ranbir Singh, was attempting to conduct
his own foreign policy by establishing direct contacts
with their imperial rival. They consequently monitored
his activities not just in Ladakh but also in Dardistan,
particularly in Gilgit.
Lying on the foothills of the Karakoram Mountains,
Gilgit controlled access to Hunza in the north east and
the passes into Chinese Turkestan. Toward the west, it
was possible to travel from Gilgit to Chitral on the Wakhan
Corridor, a narrow strip of Afghan territory separating
British India from Russian-controlled Central Asia. Sikh
rule had been extended to Gilgit in 1842. The British
transferred control of the territory to the Dogra rulers
of Jammu and Kashmir11 by the Treaty of Amritsar of
1846. Six years later, a rebellion by local tribal leaders
chafing under Dogra rule led to the ouster of the maharaja’s
forces. In 1860, however, Ranbir Singh recaptured it
and annexed it to the state of Jammu and Kashmir as
the capital of the Gilgit Wazarat.12
Seized of Dardistan’s geo-strategic potential, London
agreed to give Ranbir Singh military aid in exchange for
the stationing, in 1877, of a British agent in Gilgit to
“supervise the conduct of policy on this frontier”.13 The
existence of this agency, however, was short-lived, since
relations between the maharaja and the political agent,
Major John Biddulph, were strained. In 1881, the agency
was withdrawn, freeing the maharaja of supervision.
To curtail the maharaja’s control over the territory, the
British again established a presence in Dardistan.14 In
10 Alastair Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy (Karachi, 1994),
p. 20.
11 Gulab Singh and his successors were Dogras, a Hindu tribe
in Jammu.
12 Wazarat: ministry; wazir: minister.
13 Lamb, op. cit., pp. 28-29. In the 1870s, the British government
considered that “as a substitute for direct British rule, its best
interests lay in supporting the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir
in establishing his influence in these northern tracts of Dardistan”
to prevent Russian advances from northern Afghanistan.
14 The Russians appeared to be moving towards northern
Afghanistan from present-day Turkmenistan. There was evidence
of Russian contacts with the rulers of Chitral and Hunza. The
British also believed that Ranbir Singh’s successor, Pratap Singh,
was in “treasonable correspondence” with Czarist representatives.
They “could only conclude that the defence of the Northern
Frontier was too grave a matter to be entrusted to the Maharaja”.
Ibid.
1889, Colonel Algernon Durand reestablished the agency,
with his first challenge coming from the rulers of Hunza
and Nagar, who had joined forces against the Dogras and
posed a threat to the maharaja’s control over Gilgit as
well. The rebellion was quelled, and Hunza and Nagar
were absorbed into Gilgit Agency. The Gilgit garrison
was manned by 2,000 Jammu and Kashmir state troops,
employed by the maharaja. Locals were not recruited
until 1913, when the Corps of Gilgit Scouts was formed.15
Powers and responsibilities were divided, with defence,
foreign affairs and communications falling under the
imperial government while the maharaja controlled civil
administration through his representative, the Wazir-e-
Wazarat.16
By the 1930s, events in the agency’s neighbourhood,17
along with the maharaja’s attempts to reassert his
independence, led the British to again change their policy
towards Dardistan. On 26 March 1935, the maharaja
leased exclusive control of the part of Gilgit Agency north
of the Indus to the British for 60 years. This arrangement
remained in place until 1 August 1947, when the impending
termination of British rule in India led to the premature
dissolution of the lease agreement and the return not just
of the leased area but also the rest of Gilgit Agency to
the maharaja’s control.18 According to one historian, the
British rationale for returning the entire Gilgit Agency
was based on the assumption that the maharaja would
eventually accede to India, which the British, particularly
Lord Louis Mountbatten, the last viceroy, hoped to see
as the new guardian of the northern frontier.19
B. ACCEDING TO PAKISTAN
Britain’s decision to unilaterally dissolve the lease
agreement incensed Gilgit Agency’s predominantly
15 The Scouts comprised 600 locally recruited men, trained and
led by British officers. Even though half the cost of the Corps
came out of the Jammu and Kashmir exchequer, it did not buy
the allegiance of the troops, who remained loyal to their British
commanders. Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India,
Pakistan and the Unfinished War (New York, 2000), p. 13.
16 F. M. Khan, The Story of Gilgit, Baltistan and Chitral: A
Short History of Two Milleniums AD 7-1999 (Gilgit, 2002), p.
44.
17 Bolshevik Russia was proving an even more formidable
threat to British control over India’s northern frontiers than its
Czarist predecessor.
18 Until as late as 1941, the British government was of the opinion
that Hunza and Nagar were under the suzerainty of Jammu and
Kashmir but were not a part of it, nor were the areas of Chilas,
Koh Ghizar, Ishkoman and Yasin. But when the plan to partition
India was announced on 3 June 1947, these areas were returned
to the maharaja’s control. Schofield, op. cit. p. 62.
19 Lamb, op. cit., p. 107.
Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas
Crisis Group Asia Report N°131, 2 April 2007 Page 4
Muslim inhabitants, who were unwilling to be returned
to Hindu Dogra rule. The Gilgit Scouts were similarly
displeased at being reassigned to the maharajah’s service.
Their commander, Major William Brown, was aware that
his Muslim-majority troops were not likely to remain loyal
to a Hindu ruler but was hesitant to take any measure
that could be construed as a mutinous challenge to
the maharaja’s authority. Brown managed to keep the
Scouts under control even during the violence that
accompanied British India’s partition in August 1947 and
took no action until the maharaja decided to accede to
India.
In October 1947, Pashtun tribesmen from the Northwest
Frontier Province (NWFP), setting off on a “holy war”
against Kashmir’s Hindu ruler, marched towards Srinagar,
the maharaja’s capital.20 The territory they captured
became Azad (free) Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) on 24
October. The alarmed maharaja formally acceded to
India, following which India moved troops to Srinagar,
precipitating the first of several wars with Pakistan.
The maharaja’s decision also provoked a full-scale
rebellion in Gilgit, spearheaded by the Gilgit Scouts and
Muslim members of the Jammu and Kashmir state
troops, with the support of the overwhelmingly Muslim
local population. On 31 October, Major Brown sent
a platoon of Scouts to surround the residence of the
maharaja’s governor of Gilgit Agency, Ghansara Singh.
Other platoons took control of important locations in the
city. On 1 November, Ghansara Singh surrendered, and
a provisional government consisting of leaders of the
victorious forces was installed and remained in place until
power was transferred to the first Pakistani Political Agent
in Gilgit on 16 November.21 Two days later, Hunza and
Nagar signed instruments of accession to Pakistan.22
On 29 July 1949, Indian and Pakistani military
representatives signed an agreement in Karachi defining
the ceasefire line in the state of Jammu and Kashmir.
The frontline dividing the area controlled by the Indian
army and AJK became the western half of the Kashmir
ceasefire line. The outcome of the conflict between
20 Crisis Group Report, Kashmir: Learning from the Past, op.
cit.
21 When Brown discovered that some members of the provisional
government intended to set up an independent republic of Gilgit-
Astore, which had the support of the majority of the Scouts,
he outmanoeuvred the pro-independence faction by securing
the agreement of local leaders for accession to Pakistan. See
Schofield, op. cit., p. 63.
22 The provisional government in Gilgit did not sign a formal
letter of accession, opting instead to send a wireless message
to the Pakistan government requesting a civil administrator.
Ahmed Hassan Dani, History of Northern Areas of Pakistan
(Lahore, 2001), p. 349.
Indian and Pakistani troops determined the eastern half
of the ceasefire line. Pakistan had mounted an offensive
through Gilgit towards Leh, Ladakh’s capital, which
briefly cut the main Srinagar-Leh road at Kargil. The
Indian counter-offensive evicted Pakistan from Kargil
and elsewhere in Ladakh, confining it to Baltistan.
As a result of the 1949 ceasefire, the state of Jammu and
Kashmir was dissected into two regions of roughly similar
area. Pakistan held the Gilgit Agency, Baltistan, a narrow
portion of Kashmir province, Poonch and Mirpur in
Jammu. India controlled Ladakh, a portion of Poonch,
and the bulk of Kashmir province and Jammu.
Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas
Crisis Group Asia Report N°131, 2 April 2007 Page 5
III. SIX DECADES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
NEGLECT
A. RETAINING THE KASHMIR CONNECTION
Cobbled together by a succession of Dogra maharajas, the
princely state of Jammu and Kashmir was not monolithic
but rather a complex mosaic of cultures, nationalities and
religions. Of the areas presently under Indian control,
Jammu is predominantly Hindu and Sikh and is dominated
by the Dogras, who speak their own language, Dogri. The
areas that constitute AJK have a Sunni Muslim majority
that speaks Kashmiri, Mirpuri, Punjabi and Urdu. The
Kashmir Valley is also predominantly Sunni Muslim,
though with a small, affluent Hindu minority. The people
of the Valley claim a separate Kashmiri identity based
on the Kashmiri language and share cultural values from
a Buddhist and Hindu past. Ladakh is almost completely
Tibetan Buddhist, and its people speak Ladakhi.
In the present-day Northern Areas, the inhabitants of
Baltistan have an ethnic affinity with Ladhakis but are
Shias and speak Balti. The people of what was referred
to as Dardistan, comprising Gilgit, Hunza, Nagar, Chilas
and Astore, are also mainly orthodox Shias, although
Sunnis are more numerous in Chilas and Astore, and
Ismailis23 dominate Hunza, Punial, Yasin, Ishkoman and
Gupis. In Ghangche, an overwhelming majority belongs
to the little known Nurbakhshi sect of Islam.24 Thus
the territory that now constitutes Pakistan’s Federally
Administered Northern Areas, ethnically and culturally,
has little in common with the Vale of Kashmir, other than
the fact that the languages spoken there also belong, like
Kashmiri, to the Dardic family. This lack of affinity
explains in large part local rejection of any association
with Kashmir today. Yet despite the region’s voluntary
accession to Pakistan, Islamabad policymakers still link
it with Jammu and Kashmir.
23 Ismailism, an offshoot of Shiism, also grew out of the Sunni-
Shia dispute over succession. Ismailis believe that Ismail, the
eldest son of Jafar al-Sadiq, the sixth Imam, was his rightful heir;
orthodox Shias believe Jafar preferred his younger son, Musa.
The Ismailis are thus also known as Sevener Shias, as opposed
to orthodox Twelver Shias. While Twelver Shias believe that
the line of Imams ended with the twelfth, Ismailis have, from
Ismail onwards, been led by a uninterrupted chain of hereditary
Imams, with the current Aga Khan, Prince Karim, the spiritual
leader of the world’s Ismailis, the 49th in that chain.
24 The Nurbakhshi movement originated in the fifteenth century
in Iran and Central Asia as a mystical, messianic order founded
by Muhammad Nurbaksh and is presently found in parts of
Pakistan and India.
On 28 April 1949, Pakistan and AJK signed the Karachi
Agreement by which the latter agreed to place all affairs
relating to the Northern Areas in Pakistan’s hands.25 No
Northern Areas’ representative was present, an omission
that still rankles with many locals. “Who gave Azad
Kashmir the right to determine our political destiny? The
Karachi Agreement was nothing more than a sale of
human beings, in which Pakistan and Azad Kashmir were
customers, and we were the commodity on sale”, said
Asadullah Khan, a former president of the Northern Areas
Bar Association (NABA).26
In 1950, Pakistan’s ministry of Kashmir affairs “established
initially to deal with matters related to the Kashmir
dispute”,27 later renamed the ministry of Kashmir affairs
and Northern Areas (KANA), assumed administrative
control over Gilgit Agency, including Baltistan. KANA
retains that control. Pakistan changed the region’s name
to the Federally Administered Northern Areas (FANA)
but still it insists it is a part of the disputed state of Jammu
and Kashmir. Therefore, the Northern Areas’ constitutional
status must await a final solution of the Kashmir dispute.
As a result, the Northern Areas were not included in
Pakistan’s three constitutions, nor given representation
in its parliament. The region remains in constitutional
limbo, with its people, who largely support integration
with Pakistan, still groping for an identity and deeply
resentful of their uncertain status. “Identity is a basic
human need, and it is this identity that Pakistan has denied
to us for so long. We acceded to Pakistan because we
wanted to be a part of Pakistan, to be owned by it.
Unfortunately, it has still not owned us”, said a local
lawyer.28
1. Justification
Pakistan’s rationale in linking the Northern Areas with
Jammu and Kashmir and treating the region as part of
the disputed territory is based on the premise that the
overwhelming majority in the Northern Areas would
vote in its favour if and when a plebiscite were held to
determine Kashmir’s future.29 From the onset, Pakistan
25 Text of the Karachi Agreement of March 1949 in “Malik
Muhammad Miskeen and 2 others v. Government of Pakistan
and 10 others”, judgement of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir
High Court, Pakistan Law Decisions, 1993 (PLD 1993 Azad
J&K 1).
26 Crisis Group interview, Islamabad, February 2007.
27 Ministry of Kashmir affairs and Northern Areas,
www.pakistan.gov.pk/divisions/ContentInfo.jsp?DivID+17
& Path+155_156&ContentID+259.
28 Crisis Group interview, Asadullah Khan, former president
of the Northern Areas Bar Association (NABA), Islamabad,
February 2007.
29 A series of UN Security Council resolutions between 1948
and 1951 called for settlement of the dispute over Jammu
Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas
Crisis Group Asia Report N°131, 2 April 2007 Page 6
has followed a policy of “calculated ambiguity” toward
the areas of the former princely state of Jammu and
Kashmir under its control.30 While it contests India’s
claim over AJK and the Northern Areas, it also does not
claim them for fear that this could negate Kashmir’s
status as a disputed territory, or imply acceptance of
the territorial status quo as a permanent solution.31
While this ambiguity is meant to strengthen Pakistan’s
case for a plebiscite in Kashmir, it has given India, which
has explicitly staked its claim over all of Jammu and
Kashmir, a distinct psychological advantage.32 Were
Pakistani troops to cross the Line of Control, the operation
would be condemned by India – and in all probability
by the world community – as aggression against India.
However, if the roles were reversed and Indian forces
were to mount a similar campaign west of the Line of
Control, Pakistan, having always insisted upon the disputed
nature of Kashmir and the temporary character of the Line
of Control, would find it awkward to denounce this as
aggression against itself. “Unlike their Indian rivals,
Pakistanis have been forced by circumstances to…risk
the part of Jammu and Kashmir now in their possession
in order to safeguard their claim to the part that isn’t”.33
The fragility of Pakistan’s position is not lost on the people
of the Northern Areas. India treats “Kashmir as an integral
part [of the Indian state]. Pakistan should do the same.
By not doing so, it is making us vulnerable as well as
undermining its own position”, said a lawyer in Gilgit.34
Another lawyer commented: “If India decides one fine
day to invade and capture the Northern Areas, what legal
basis will Pakistan have to resist the invasion when it does
not claim the Northern Areas as its own territory?”35 To
obviate the possibility of Indian aggression as well as
meet demands for political and civil rights, local lawyers
argue, Pakistan would be better served by granting the
Northern Areas provisional provincial status. While they
would still be formally considered a part of Kashmir, and
thus included in any future negotiations, they would then
enjoy the same level of autonomy, and have the same
institutions of governance as Pakistan’s four federal units.
“Pakistan gave away our land to China in the 1960s while
and Kashmir’s accession to India or Pakistan through “the
democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite”.
30 Robert G. Wirsing, India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute:
On Regional Conflict and its Resolution (London, 1994), p. 64.
31 Pakistani acceptance of the status quo would mean
acknowledging the Line of Control, the ceasefire line established
in 1949, as an international boundary, thereby recognising
India’s claim over the Kashmir Valley.
32 Wirsing, op. cit., p. 64.
33 Ibid, p. 65.
34 Crisis Group interview, Ali Khan, General Secretary Northern
Areas Bar Association (NABA), Gilgit, August 2006.
35 Crisis Group interview, Asadullah Khan, Gilgit, August 2006.
retaining the Kashmir proviso. The precedent is there and
could be applied in our case as well”.36
2. Enforcement
Pakistan’s approach to the Northern Areas’ constitutional
status is beset with contradictions. It does not mention the
region in its constitution, refusing to give it provincial or
even provisional provincial status. Yet it also treats it,
for practical purposes, as Pakistani territory. In 1977, for
instance, General Zia-ul-Haq extended martial law to the
Northern Areas but not to AJK. In 1982, three Northern
Areas members were granted observer status in the Federal
Advisory Council (Majlis-i-Shura), the military governmentnominated,
quasi-legislative body.37 But the fear of
weakening its case on Kashmir deters Pakistan from
“committing itself flatly one way or the other in regard to
the finality of Gilgit Agency’s present territorial status”.38
In the case of AJK, however, Pakistan has taken a
completely different position. While it insists that AJK,
like the Northern Areas, is a part of the disputed territory
of Kashmir, it has granted it at least the trappings of
autonomy. Unlike the Northern Areas, which are
administered by Islamabad, AJK has its own government.
In 1972, the AJK Legislative Assembly passed a resolution
demanding the return of the Northern Areas, which had
been taken over “temporarily” by Pakistan under the
Karachi Agreement, a demand Pakistan has chosen to
ignore.39 In 1993, the AJK High Court, accepting a petition
challenging Pakistan’s authority to administer the Northern
Areas, ruled that Islamabad had “no legitimate cause…to
keep the Northern Areas and their residents (Jammu
and Kashmir state subjects) detached from Azad Jammu
and Kashmir”.40 The High Court stressed that it was
contradictory to claim that the Northern Areas were part
neither of AJK nor of Pakistan. It accordingly directed
the AJK government to “immediately assume the
administrative control of the Northern Areas and annex
it with the administration of Azad Jammu and Kashmir”.
Pakistan appealed to the AJK Supreme Court, which
36 Crisis Group interview, Eesa Khan, senior advocate and former
president of the NABA, Gilgit, August 2006. The Sino-Pakistan
Border Agreement of 1963 covered a portion of China’s common
border with the Northern Areas. Pakistan relinquished claims to
over 1,500 sq. miles of territory, while China ceded 750 sq. miles.
However, the accord was recognised by both signatories as
provisional, pending final settlement of the Kashmir dispute.
Wirsing, op. cit., p. 102.
37 Ibid, p. 66.
38 Ibid, p. 67.
39 Khalid Hassan, “Northern Areas demystified”, The Friday
Times, 25 April-1 May 2003.
40 “Malik Muhammad Miskeen and 2 others v. Government of
Pakistan”, op. cit.
Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas
Crisis Group Asia Report N°131, 2 April 2007 Page 7
overturned the High Court’s verdict, declaring that while
the Northern Areas were an integral part of the former state
of Jammu and Kashmir, they were not a part of AJK.41
Since the Supreme Court did not declare the Northern
Areas a part of Pakistan, one analyst viewed the decision
as indicating that Pakistan’s “takeover of these areas is
without legal or constitutional authority”.42
B. THE NORTHERN AREAS AND AJK:
DIVERGENT PATHS
Should Islamabad reject other preferred options in the
Northern Areas such as provincial or provisional provincial
status or merger with AJK, there is support across political,
ethnic and sectarian lines in the Northern Areas for the same
status and privileges as AJK. “An AJK-like status would
be acceptable to most locals”, said Hafeez-ur-Rehman,
president of the Northern Areas Pakistan Muslim League-
Nawaz (PML-N), a Sunni.43 Syed Jaffar Shah, president
of the Northern Areas Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), a
Shia, concurred and questioned the refusal to deny the
Northern Areas an AJK-like status. “If AJK could get so
much without anything untoward happening to Pakistan
and the Kashmir cause, then why should all hell break
loose if the Northern Areas were given the same status?”44
Members of President Musharraf’s Northern Areas Pakistan
Muslim League-Quaid-i-Azam (PML-Q), reliant as they
are on the military for survival, are understandably more
muted in their criticism.45 But while they are reluctant to
oppose Musharraf’s policies, some Northern Areas PMLQ
members call on Pakistan to treat the region on an equal
footing with AJK. “If provincial status is not feasible,
then we should at the very least be given the same status
as AJK”, said a Sunni PML-Q member of the Northern
Areas Legislative Council (NALC).46
While AJK has the trappings of statehood, it is only
nominally independent; decision-making authority is
formally vested in the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council,
headed by the prime minister of Pakistan, while KANA
exercises supervisory control.47 The AJK legislative
assembly, although theoretically independent, is in effect
41 “Federation of Pakistan v. Malik Muhammad Miskeen and
8 others”, reported in Pakistan Law Decisions, 1995 (PLD
1995 SC [AJ&K] 1).
42 Khalid Hassan, op. cit.
43 Crisis Group interview, Islamabad, August 2006.
44 Crisis Group interview, Gilgit, August 2006.
45 See Crisis Group Asia Report N°102, Authoritarianism
and Political Party Reform in Pakistan, 28 September 2005.
46 Crisis Group interview, Islamabad, July 2006.
47 For more on Pakistan’s control over AJK, see Crisis Group
Reports, Learning from the Past and The View from Islamabad,
op. cit.
subordinate to the whims of the Pakistani military, which
dictates all policy through the AJK Council.48 The Pakistani
government also retains the right to dismiss the elected AJK
government.49 But while Pakistan regards both AJK and
the Northern Areas as parts of the disputed territory
of Jammu and Kashmir, it has at least given AJK some
autonomy, while denying the latter any civil and political
rights.
1. Constitutional and administrative development
After the 1949 ceasefire, the Azad Jammu and Kashmir
government saw its original role of a government in
exile “overtaken by the demands of having to administer
the land to the west of the ceasefire line on a day to day
basis”.50 Under the 1949 Karachi Agreement, Pakistan
and AJK placed the following within its purview:51
􀂉 policy with regard to the administration of AJK
territory;
􀂉 general supervision of administration in AJK;
􀂉 publicity with regard to the activities of the Azad
Kashmir Government and administration;
􀂉 advice to the Pakistani government on negotiations
with the UN Commission for India and Pakistan;
and
􀂉 development of AJK’s economic resources.
It was also agreed that the pro-Pakistan Muslim Conference
Party, having played a key role in resisting the maharaja’s
rule, would be allowed control over the following:
􀂉 publicity with regard to a plebiscite in AJK;
􀂉 fieldwork and publicity in the Indian-occupied area
of the state;
􀂉 organisation of political activities in AJK and the
Indian occupied area;
􀂉 preliminary arrangements in connection with the
plebiscite and organisation of its conduct;
􀂉 political work and publicity among the Kashmiri
refugees in Pakistan; and, shared with the AJK
government,
􀂉 advice to the Pakistani government on negotiations
with the UN Commission for India and Pakistan.
48 Crisis Group Report, India/Pakistan Relations and Kashmir,
op. cit.
49 Ibid.
50 Schofield, op. cit., p. 89.
51 “Malik Muhammad Miskeen and 2 others v. Government
of Pakistan”, op. cit.
Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas
Crisis Group Asia Report N°131, 2 April 2007 Page 8
Pakistan retained control over:
􀂉 defence;
􀂉 foreign policy;
􀂉 negotiations with the UN Commission for India
and Pakistan;
􀂉 publicity in Pakistan and abroad;
􀂉 coordination and arrangement of relief and
rehabilitation of refugees;
􀂉 coordination of publicity in connection with a
plebiscite;
􀂉 all activities within Pakistan regarding Kashmir,
such as procurement of food and other supplies,
running of refugee camps and provision of medical
aid; and
􀂉 the affairs of Gilgit and Ladakh.
In 1947, AJK was at a far more advanced state of political
awareness and economic development than the Northern
Areas, which lacked an indigenous political leadership that
could fight for the region’s interests. The people of AJK
also shared cultural and linguistic ties with Pakistan’s
dominant province, Punjab. The AJK leadership was,
therefore, better placed, than the Northern Areas to extract
concessions from Pakistani decision-makers. The Northern
Areas had little in common with the rest of Pakistan other
than a shared adherence to Islam, but there were differences
even on that count. While most Pakistani citizens are Sunnis,
the Northern Areas have a Shia majority. Many locals are
convinced that fear of empowering that Shia majority was
instrumental in the refusal to allow the Northern Areas
even the limited autonomy granted to AJK.
2. Azad Jammu and Kashmir
In 1950, an ordinance called “Rules of Business of the
Azad Kashmir Government” became the law of the land.
Full legislative and executive authority was vested in the
“Supreme Head of State”, in effect the leader of the
Muslim Conference, who had the power to appoint the
president, members of the Council of Ministers and the
chief justice and other judges of the AJK High Court.52
The supreme head’s authority was, however, exercised
within the parameters framed by KANA. The position
was replaced in 1952 by the position of president.
The first major constitutional change in AJK, the AJK
Government Act of 1970, created a presidential system,
with direct elections on the basis of adult franchise for
the president and legislature. This system was, however,
52 Schofield, op. cit., p. 90.
short-lived. The Interim Constitution Act of 1974, AJK’s
first constitution, modelled on Pakistan’s of the previous
year, created a parliamentary form of government, with
a largely ceremonial role for the president.53 Although it
has been amended several times, the Interim Constitution
of 1974 remains AJK’s basic law and its chief guarantor
of an internal autonomy exercised within clearly prescribed
limits set by Pakistan. For instance, Article 7(2) denies
elected office to any individual who “propagates against,
or takes part in activities prejudicial or detrimental to the
ideology of the State’s accession to Pakistan” .54
3. The Northern Areas
Constitutional development in the Northern Areas has
followed a markedly different route. A political agent was
initially given charge of the region, following the imperial
British model of centralised control. After a brief period
under NWFP’s administrative control, Gilgit Agency,
including Baltistan, placed under KANA in 1950. As in
the Federally Administered Tribal Agencies (FATA),55
the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) was applied to
Gilgit Agency.56 Local rulers were co-opted through the
payment of subsidies and were allowed to retain most of
the revenue collected in their domains. While the rulers
of Hunza and Nagar were accorded executive, judicial and
legislative powers, these were exercised in accordance
with the political agent’s directives.57
In 1952, the KANA joint secretary, a mid-ranking civil
servant, was given the additional responsibility of
administering the Northern Areas as political resident,
based, however, not in Gilgit but in the federal capital.
This arrangement remained in place until 1967, when the
position of political resident of the Northern Areas was
created, headquartered in Gilgit. As the federal government’s
representative, the resident had extraordinary powers.
He headed the local administration and judiciary, was
responsible for enforcement of the FCR and was also the
financial and revenue commissioner. Two political agents
assisted the resident, one in each of the two agencies after
Baltistan was given the status of a separate agency. The
resident also exercised legislative powers in the Northern
Areas in consultation with the federal government.58
Pakistan’s second military ruler, General Yahya Khan,
53 A brief overview of AJK’s constitutional development is
provided in the preamble to the Azad Jammu and Kashmir
Interim Constitution of 1974.
54 See Crisis Group Report, India/Pakistan Relations and
Kashmir, op. cit.
55 See Crisis Group Asia Report Nº125, Pakistan’s Tribal
Areas: Appeasing the Militants, 11 December 2006.
56 FCR is discussed in ibid.
57 Dani, op. cit., p. 409.
58 Ibid, p. 406.
Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas
Crisis Group Asia Report N°131, 2 April 2007 Page 9
created a Northern Areas Advisory Council (NAAC) in
1969 but it was devoid of decision-making powers and
subordinate to the resident.
Under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the country’s democratically
elected prime minister, major administrative changes were
made. The agency system, along with the FCR and the
rule of hereditary princes, was abolished in 1974, and
Gilgit and Baltistan were transformed into districts like
those in Pakistan’s settled areas. The resident became a
resident commissioner, while the political agents became
deputy commissioners. A Northern Areas Council (NAC)
replaced the NAAC in 1974, with members elected by
direct adult franchise.59
Although Bhutto changed the Northern Areas’
administrative structures, he denied them the institutions of
government created in AJK by the Interim Constitution
of 1974, which included its own president, prime minister,
legislative assembly, supreme court, high court, public
service commission and even flag and anthem. The
members of the AJK assembly, as in any parliamentary
democracy, are directly elected and select the prime minister
from among their own members. Pakistan controls areas
like defence, foreign policy and communications through
the AJK Council and KANA but the AJK government has
autonomy in many internal matters.
In stark contrast, the Northern Areas were denied their own
constitution. Instead, the Northern Areas Council Legal
Framework Order (LFO) of 1994, an administrative
instrument devised by KANA and imposed on the region
without any local input, supplemented by the Northern
Areas Rules of Business (NARoB) also of 1994, serves
as their basic law, under which the KANA federal minister
heads the executive branch.60
KANA is responsible for policy, administration and
development in the Northern Areas and also for law
making.61 Under the LFO, the NAC has become the
Northern Areas Legislative Council (NALC). While the
number of seats has been increased, and it is democratically
elected, the NALC has only limited advisory functions. It
lacks meaningful legislative powers and wields no control
over the executive, which still consists of bureaucrats
appointed by the KANA minister. Since the LFO is
an administrative order, not a formal constitution, the
chief executive can modify or even do away with it merely
59 Ministry of Kashmir affairs and Northern Areas,
www.pakistan.gov.pk/divisions/ContentInfo.jsp?DivID=17
&cPath=155_584&ContentID=3845.
60 The KANA minister has the title of chief executive of the
Northern Areas.
61 Ministry of Kashmir affairs and Northern Areas,
www.pakistan.gov.pk/divisions/ContentInfo.jsp?DivID+1
7 &Path+155_156&ContentID+259.
by issuing a notification. As a result, the legislature and
judicial institutions are subservient to his will.
Since the Northern Areas have no representation in any
federal constitutional or political forum, stakeholders cannot
articulate demands or grievances to a wider audience. The
Northern Areas’ executive serves the federal executive and
has no local electoral constituency and hence no need to
respond to local pressure. Absent from decision-making
forums in Islamabad, the Northern Areas also have no voice
on the budget. Federal allocations to the provinces are
made on the basis of the National Finance Commission
(NFC) Award. Since the Northern Areas are not represented,
it is up to KANA to advance demands as it sees fit. While
local wings of the mainstream national parties are in the
NALC, there is little they can do to promote the Northern
Areas’ political or economic interests since the region is
completely subservient to the federal executive. Even if
they were to plead the case in the National Assembly, it
would in all probability be fruitless, since President
Musharraf has concentrated all powers in his person,
rendering the national legislature powerless.
In January 2007, the chief executive of the Northern Areas
declared that Islamabad was in the final stages of preparing
a package of constitutional reforms, which would be sent
to the federal cabinet for approval.62 The extent to which the
package addresses local grievances and would constitute
meaningful change is yet to be seen. But Musharraf’s record
in office gives scant grounds for optimism. “We have been
hearing about reforms for the past seven years but nothing
has happened on the ground. Why should we then be
hopeful that it will be any different this time?” said Syed
Jaffar Shah of the Northern Areas PPP.63
In an earlier report on Kashmir, Crisis Group urged
Pakistan’s military government to grant the Northern
Areas a meaningful measure of autonomy, a well-defined
constitutional status and representation in the national
legislature.64 The military, however, is predisposed to
centralising, not devolving power at the national or local
levels.65 Genuine reform in the Northern Areas is unlikely
until and unless there is a democratic dispensation, not
just in the region but also in Pakistan.
62 Muhammad Yasin, “N. Areas representatives to get
constitutional powers”, Dawn, 17 January 2007.
63 Crisis Group interview, Islamabad, February 2007.
64 Crisis Group Report, India/Pakistan Relations and Kashmir,
op. cit.
65 See Crisis Group Asia Report N°77, Devolution in Pakistan:
Reform or Regression, 22 March 2004; and Crisis Group Asia
Briefing N°43, Pakistan’s Local Polls: Shoring Up Military Rule,
22 November 2005.
Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas
Crisis Group Asia Report N°131, 2 April 2007 Page 10
C. THE LEGAL DIMENSION
In May 1999, the Supreme Court of Pakistan delivered a
landmark judgement on the constitutional status of the
Northern Areas in response to Constitutional Petition 17
of 1994, which sought the following remedies:
􀂉 enforcement of fundamental rights under the
constitution of Pakistan;
􀂉 declaration of the Northern Areas’ constitutional
status;
􀂉 declaration of the people of the Northern Areas
as full citizens of Pakistan, with the right fully to
participate in the affairs of the federation; and
􀂉 granting of provincial status.
Declaring that Pakistan exercised de facto as well as de jure
administrative control over the Northern Areas, the Supreme
Court ruled that the people of the Northern Areas were
“citizens of Pakistan, for all intents and purposes”.66
As such, they could invoke constitutionally guaranteed
fundamental rights. Reference was also made to Pakistan’s
obligations in the Northern Areas as a signatory to
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The ruling
emphasised that the people of the Northern Areas were
“entitled to participate in the governance of their area and
to have an independent judiciary to enforce, inter alia, the
Fundamental Rights”.67
The Supreme Court decreed that the people of the region
were not able to exercise their right to govern through their
chosen representatives because the NALC could not
be equated with provincial government. Moreover, the
Northern Areas Chief Court, the primary judicial organ in
the region, had no constitutional jurisdiction, and there
was no forum to which to appeal its decisions. It was,
therefore, “patent that the people of the Northern Areas
have been denied their fundamental right to have access
to justice through an independent judiciary”.68
The Supreme Court declared it could not prescribe a form
of government for the region, nor could it direct that the
region be represented in the national parliament since that
could undermine Pakistan’s stand on Kashmir. It left such
issues to the government and national parliament. However,
it directed the government to take “proper administrative
and legislative steps” to ensure that the people of the
Northern Areas enjoyed their rights under Pakistan’s
66 See “Al-Jehad Trust and 9 others v. Federation of Pakistan
and 3 others”, Supreme Court Monthly Review, 1999, p.1379
(1999 SCMR 1379).
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
constitution. It also enlarged the jurisdiction of the Northern
Areas’ Chief Court to include constitutional petitions,
while simultaneously calling for the establishment of a
Court of Appeals.
While the Court gave the government six months to
implement this judgement, it took the Musharraf
government almost six years to set up the Court of Appeals.
According to a former president of the Northern Areas
Bar Association, KANA’s “non-cooperative” attitude was
responsible for this delay, since an independent judiciary
could challenge its unfettered powers. He added: “Matters
were also not helped by the uninterested approach of
the Supreme Court itself, which passed the judgement but
then refused to ensure its speedy implementation, even
though we ran from pillar to post to convince it of the
importance of doing so”.69
The military government has yet to implement the Court’s
directives with regards to the fundamental rights of the
people of the Northern Areas, including their right to
be governed through their elected representatives. Local
political institutions remain impotent, and federal control
is pervasive. “A municipal committee in Pakistan continues
to have more powers than our legislature, in spite of the
fact that the Supreme Court has given us the right of selfrule.
This is nothing less than a blatant violation of the 1999
judgement”, a retired member of the Chief Court said. 70
69 Crisis Group interview, Islamabad, February 2007.
70 Crisis Group interview, Gilgit, August 2006.
Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas
Crisis Group Asia Report N°131, 2 April 2007 Page 11
IV. POLITICAL DISEMPOWERMENT
A. CENTRALISED CONTROL
The Pakistan military has ultimate authority over decisions
not just about but also within the Northern Areas. The
overall control of military forces in the Northern Areas
falls under the Army’s 10 Corps, headed by a lieutenant
general and headquartered in Rawalpindi. The region’s
military command is with the Force Command Northern
Areas (FCNA), headed by a major general and based in
Gilgit. Tasked with defending the Northern Areas’ borders,
the FCNA also exercises enormous influence over internal
affairs, not just law enforcement but also administrative
issues such as postings and transfers. A senior police official
disclosed that the police must seek FCNA permission even
for routine deployments, for instance at check posts.71
According to locals, army monitoring teams supervise
government departments and public sector corporations.
An analyst said army officers, including majors and
captains, oversee recruitment and appointments and even
approve government contracts and tenders.72
As noted, the KANA federal minister is the Northern
Areas’ chief executive, responsible for coordinating and
implementing policy, including finance, such as sanctioning
expenditure and reappropriating funds from the budget
approved by the federal government. He also wields
extensive administrative powers, including recruitment
and posting of civil bureaucrats. While he is an elected
member of the National Assembly in Islamabad, he is
not an elected member of the Northern Areas Legislative
Council. He governs from Islamabad, not the region.
The deputy chief executive (DCE) is the region’s highest
elected official, the leader of the house in the Northern
Areas Legislative Council, the region’s legislative forum,
but he serves at the pleasure of the KANA minister. Under
the NARoB, the chief executive, DCE and chief secretary
constitute the “Government” of the region. In fact, the chief
executive runs the entire administrative machinery through
his chief secretary, the most senior civil bureaucrat.73 The
chief secretary, not the DCE, is responsible for all matters
affecting “public tranquillity”,74 a term that is defined
broadly enough to include anything of consequence.
Although the DCE has the status of a minister of state,
with attendant perks and privileges, he exercises only
powers expressly delegated to him by the chief executive.75
71 Crisis Group interview, Gilgit, October 2006.
72 Crisis Group interview, Islamabad, December 2006.
73 Rule 2 of the NARoB.
74 Rule 9 of the NARoB.
75 Rule 6 of the NARoB.
The chief executive does consult the DCE on the
appointment of advisers, who have the status of provincial
ministers, but is not bound to follow his advice. “The
fact that an elected Leader of the House is termed the
‘deputy’ of an un-elected chief executive is tantamount
to a negation of the Supreme Court’s ruling of 1999,
which provided the right of self-rule through chosen
representatives”, said a retired member of the Chief
Court.76 Similarly, while advisers have the status of
provincial ministers, they have little influence over the
departments they are meant to supervise. “The advisers
have been softened up by being given the status of
provincial ministers. They get a car and a house and
other perks so they don’t complain”, said an NALC
member.77 A secretary heads each department and reports
to the chief secretary, who in turn reports to the chief
executive. The elected representatives of the people are
thus completely bypassed.
At the national level, recruitment to civil service positions
is through the Federal Public Service Commission, with a
quota reserved for each of the four provinces on the basis
of population. In addition, AJK has a quota of 2 per cent.
The bureaucrats recruited are all federal employees. Each
province, and AJK, also has its own local bureaucracy
recruited through its provincial public service commission.
The Northern Areas have neither a separate quota in the
federal bureaucracy nor a share in the AJK quota. Instead,
they are lumped together with the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas in a combined 4 per cent quota, possibly on
the grounds that FATA is also a federally administered
territory. Without a public service commission of its own
like AJK, it cannot recruit local bureaucrats. These are
recruited by the Federal Public Service Commission
and so are employees of the federal government, not the
Northern Areas administration.
Non-local bureaucrats, seconded to the region, dominate
the higher echelons of the bureaucracy in the Northern
Areas. Since they come from outside and more often than
not serve in the region for short periods, they have neither
the time nor the inclination to build local government
capacity. In the absence of adequate public sector capacity,
service delivery is weak. Governance structures are marred
by a lack of transparency and accountability, not even
sharing “information proactively, either among themselves
or with the general public”.78
76 Crisis Group interview, Gilgit, August 2006.
77 Crisis Group interview, Haider Khan, Islamabad, August
2006.
78 Musharraf Rasool Cyan and Afzal Latif, “NASSD Background
Paper: Governance”, IUCN, Northern Areas Program, Gilgit,
2003, www.iucn.org/places/pakistan/publications/3-
Governance.pdf.
Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas
Crisis Group Asia Report N°131, 2 April 2007 Page 12
B. LEGISLATIVE IMPOTENCE
The Northern Areas Legislative Council has 36 members,
of whom 24 are directly elected on the basis of adult
franchise.79 Six seats are reserved for women and six for
technocrats, one of each from the six districts.80 The leader
of the house in the Council is appointed the deputy chief
executive and is thus the region’s highest-ranking elected
official. Six Council members, one of whom must be
a woman, are appointed by the chief executive, after
consultation with the DCE, as advisers to him “for
the performance of such duties and functions as may be
assigned or entrusted to them from time to time”.81
Although it is the elected legislature, the NALC is
subordinate to the unelected and unrepresentative chief
executive, whose prerogative it is to summon, prorogue
and dissolve it,82 as well as to frame its rules of procedure.
The NALC has no input in the preparation of the annual
budget, which is simply placed before it by the chief
executive in the form of a statement for purposes of
information.83 Under the 1994 LFO, the NALC is
empowered to legislate in 49 areas but no bill can become
law without the chief executive’s assent.84 If this is denied,
the Council cannot challenge. For instance, the NALC
recently passed unanimously three bills that had been
pending for five years but they still require the KANA
minister’s approval to become law.85
Complaining that the Council was powerless, an NALC
member from Musharraf’s ruling party said its bills were
“not worth the paper they are written on”.86 From 1999 to
2004, the NALC passed eighteen public interest resolutions
and submitted them to the KANA ministry but not a single
79 Six are elected from Gilgit, six from Skardu, four from Diamer,
three from Ghizer, three from Ghangche and two from Astore.
80 Candidates for reserved seats must be nominated by their
parties before the directly elected members elect them.
81 Rule 7 of the NARoB. The advisers monitor the functioning
of administrative departments (Section 5[3] of the LFO) and
hold office at the discretion of the chief executive (Section 5[2]
of the LFO).
82 Under Schedule V, Part B, of the NARoB, the chief executive
can dissolve the Council with the prior approval of the federal
government. However, the power to summon and prorogue the
Council is within his discretion.
83 Schedule V, Part A, of the NARoB.
84 Section 17A of the LFO.
85 The Northern Areas Allotment of Crown Land Act, the
Northern Areas Law of Pre-Emption Act and the Northern
Areas Rent Restriction Act 2006, see “NALC enacts three
bills for first time”, Daily Times, 28 December 2006.
86 Crisis Group interview, Haider Khan, PML-Q member from
Diamer, Islamabad, August 2006.
one was implemented.87 In 2003, a bill for an interim
constitution, similar to the AJK’s, was approved by 20 of
the 24 directly elected Council members. This “Northern
Areas Interim Constitution Act” envisaged a president
and prime minister for the Northern Areas, along with a
Supreme Court, high court, public service commission,
auditor-general, advocate-general and election commission,
but was ignored by Islamabad.
The KANA ministry, under the Federal Rules of Business
of 1973, is still authorised to legislate for the Northern
Areas.88 It also retains the right to extend any law, federal
or provincial, to the region. A federal law does not
automatically apply to the Northern Areas; KANA must
first issue a notification to that effect.89 If a law passed by
the NALC conflicts with a federal law, the latter prevails.90
The federal government also retains the right to legislate
on topics not mentioned in the LFO.91
There are no legislative checks on the executive’s authority.
“We in the Northern Areas have a truly unique form of
democracy in the sense that the elected members of the
NALC cannot move a vote of no-confidence against the
DCE, who is, after all, just one of them”, said an NALC
member.92
C. POLITICAL MANIPULATION
Most mainstream Pakistani parties have branches in the
Northern Areas and are represented in the NALC. The
first party-based elections in the Northern Areas were held
in 1994 by Benazir Bhutto’s PPP government. Under
Musharraf, however, party capacity in the region has
regressed since the military government seeks to
marginalise political opposition, particularly Benazir
Bhutto’s PPP and Nawaz Sharif’s Muslim League. 93
Just as Musharraf’s PML-Q was brought to power through
rigged national elections in 2002, the PML-Q became
the majority party in the NALC through Islamabad’s
87 Sarmad Abbas, “Rites of Passage”, The Herald, April 2006,
p. 47.
88 See “Environmental Law in Pakistan-Northern Areas”, IUCN
Pakistan (2004), Environmental Program, Karachi, Pakistan,
www.iucn.org/places/pakistan/publications/NA%20Review%2
0Vol-1.pdf.
89 Ibid.
90 Section 17C of the LFO.
91 “Environmental Law in Pakistan-Northern Areas”, op.cit.
92 Crisis Group interview, Bashir Ahmed Khan, Islamabad,
July 2006.
93 The military government’s marginalising of the mainstream
moderate parties is discussed in Crisis Group Report,
Authoritarianism and Political Party Reform in Pakistan, op.
cit.
Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas
Crisis Group Asia Report N°131, 2 April 2007 Page 13
manipulations of the 2004 elections. As in the national
polls, the PPP is the military’s main civilian contender in
the Northern Areas. It has strong support partly because
of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s reforms but also because the
region’s Shias and Ismailis view the centre-left party
as more sympathetic to minority concerns than other
mainstream Pakistani parties.
In 2004, the PML-Q won four of the 24 direct seats to the
PPP’s seven but still managed to cobble together a majority
by promising adviser positions to eleven independent
members. “Records were broken in pre-poll rigging. The
intelligence agencies themselves vetted candidates and
distributed tickets”, said Syed Jaffar Shah of the PPP.94
Rejecting such charges, a ruling party member insisted:
“Had it been so, the PML-Q would have swept the
elections. Instead, we won just four seats”. However, the
same member conceded that independents were then won
over by “being promised virtually everything”.95 A PMLN
Council member said: “The independent members
conducted their campaigns by criticising Musharraf but
then jumped onto his bandwagon once they were elected,
thereby betraying the mandate given to them by their
constituents”.96 The PML-Q even accepted former officebearers
of the banned Sunni and Shia sectarian parties,
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Tehreek-e-Jafria
Pakistan, respectively.97
The PML-Q’s leadership in the Northern Areas is
composed almost entirely of defectors from the PML-N,
including Mir Ghazanfar Ali Khan, who was handpicked
by Islamabad to become the DCE, and Malik Miskeen,
an aspirant for that job who was persuaded to become
the speaker instead. The deputy speaker position went to
Asad Zaidi, a PPP turncoat.98
Locals, even those who support Musharraf’s party,
are concerned that the sidelining of moderate parties and
manipulation of the political process by the military are
empowering Islamist, particularly sectarian, forces, which
have benefited the most from the resultant political vacuum.
“The mullahs have been strengthened at the expense of the
mainstream political leadership”, said PML-Q’s Asadullah
Khan. “People carry their problems to the mullahs instead
of their political representatives because they know that
the former can prevail upon the administration to get the
job done while the latter have no clout whatsoever”.99
94 Crisis Group interview, Syed Jaffar Shah, Gilgit, August 2006.
95 Crisis Group interview, Gilgit, August 2006.
96 Crisis Group interview, Hafeez-ur-Rehman, Islamabad, August
2006.
97 Sarmad Abbas, “Turncoats to Technocrats”, The Herald,
April 2006, p. 46.
98 Ibid.
99 Crisis Group interview, Asadullah Khan, Islamabad, February
2007.
D. JUDICIAL DEPENDENCE
Despite the 1999 Supreme Court ruling, there is no judicial
independence in the region. No Northern Areas court
has the authority to question the validity of any action
undertaken, or any order passed, under the LFO.100 While
courts in Pakistan and AJK have judges with the honorific
“justice” preceding their names to indicate the dignity of
their office, “chairmen” preside over the Court of Appeals
and the Chief Court in the Northern Areas, with “members”
to assist them. The higher judiciary in Pakistan and AJK
have constitutional protection; the Northern Areas Court
of Appeals and Chief Court have been created by KANA
notifications or orders that lack the legitimacy and
authority of constitutional provisions.
The Pakistan and AJK constitutions have specific
provisions for the appointment of judges,101 including
security of tenure, and regulatory mechanisms for the
courts.102 In the Northern Areas, the executive appoints
judges. The prime minister of Pakistan makes
appointments to the Northern Areas Court of Appeals
and the Chief Court on the advice of the chief executive,
with the elected DCE and NALC excluded from the
process. Pakistan’s Federal Public Service Commission
appoints judges of the subordinate courts, such as the
district-level sessions courts and sub-divisional-level civil
courts.103 Regulatory powers, according to Article 2 of
the Chief Court Establishment Order of 1998, are vested
in a committee consisting of the chief executive, the
secretary of the KANA division and the secretary of the
federal law ministry.
Judges in the Northern Areas are deprived of the job
security provided to their counterparts in Pakistan. Under
Article 200 of the Pakistan constitution, a judge of a
High Court cannot be transferred to another High Court
100 Article 20 of the LFO.
101 Under Article 177 of the Pakistan constitution, the president
appoints a judge of the Supreme Court after consulting the chief
justice. Under Article 42(4) of the AJK interim constitution, the
AJK president appoints a judge of the Supreme Court on the
advice of the AJK Council after consultation with the chief
justice.
102 Article 209 of the Pakistan constitution provides for a
Supreme Judicial Council, consisting of the chief justice of the
Supreme Court, the next two most senior Supreme Court judges
and the two most senior judges of the four High Courts, to
regulate the affairs of the superior judiciary. Article 42-E of the
AJK interim constitution provides for a Supreme Judicial Council
consisting of the chief justice of the AJK Supreme Court, a senior
judge of the Supreme Court and the chief justice of the High Court.
103 AJK has its own public service commission that recruits locals
to serve in administrative and judicial departments, as do each
of Pakistan’s four provinces. The Northern Areas are denied this
facility.
Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas
Crisis Group Asia Report N°131, 2 April 2007 Page 14
without his consent. In the Northern Areas, however,
judges can be transferred by the executive not only from
one judicial post to another but to any federal or provincial
government position or even to a local authority or
municipal corporation. The executive can even make a
judge an officer on special duty, which deprives him of
a position while he continues to receive his salary.
Under Article 179 of the Pakistan constitution, a Supreme
Court justice holds office until 65. In the Northern Areas,
a chairman or member of the Court of Appeals, technically
the equivalent of the Pakistan Supreme Court, is appointed
on contract for three years. The contract can be extended
by two years, subject to “performance”. A retired member
of the Chief Court asked: “How can one expect a judge
to go against the government during those three years,
knowing that the power to extend his tenure lies with
the government itself? Our judges strive to remain in
the good books of the chief executive and the KANA
ministry to ensure their extensions”.104
E. RIGHTS VERSUS DEVELOPMENT
Some NALC members, particularly those from Musharraf’s
PML-Q, insist that Pakistan is giving the region more
financial aid and undertaking more development than
ever before. They argue that political rights are secondary,
and development must remain the priority, at least for
the foreseeable future. “I tell those clamouring for
political rights that it is not rights that matter but
development. Once we are developed, we can ask for
rights. Until then, let us be content with the development
that Pakistan has undertaken on our benefit”, said an
adviser.105 However, political disempowerment is
undeniably generating resentment against Pakistan.
“Nations can only be kept together if their people are
given the right to determine their destinies, not through any
other factor, not even religion, as the case of Bangladesh
proves. I have warned the government time and again
not to create a Bangladesh-like situation in the Northern
Areas”, said PML-N’s Rehman.106
In July 2006, Musharraf spoke at length to a public
gathering in Gilgit about developmental activities in the
Northern Areas but was silent about political rights.107
According to a NALC member, local legislators presented
him with unanimously agreed amendments to the LFO,
including changing the legislature’s title from “Council”
to “Assembly”; providing for a no confidence vote against
the DCE; and creating the position of leader of the
104 Crisis Group interview, Gilgit, August 2006.
105 Crisis Group interview, Islamabad, July 2006.
106 Crisis Group interview, Islamabad, August 2006.
107 “Northern Areas to get dam royalty”, Dawn, 6 July 2006.
opposition and separate opposition benches. “Musharraf
said that these are very sensitive issues and that he would
have to think about them very carefully. What is so sensitive
in replacing ‘Council’ with ‘Assembly’? If it is not sensitive
for AJK, why is it so sensitive for the Northern Areas?”,
asked an opposition NALC member.108 Presiding over a
meeting with the DCE and his advisers in Islamabad in
January 2007, Northern Areas chief executive Major (ret.)
Tahir Iqbal said Islamabad was willing to give the NALC
provincial assembly status but “greater homework” was
needed, as there were “serious administrative and legal
matters involved”.109
The government fails to acknowledge that rights and
development are intrinsically interlinked. For instance, the
proposed construction of Bhasha dam is a developmental
issue with political and economic implications and has
the potential to create even greater resentment towards
Islamabad. A hydroelectric project, it entails the
construction of a reservoir on the Indus River with a
storage capacity of 7.3 million acre feet and a power
generation capacity of 4,500 megawatts.110 The dam’s
location will be just downstream of Chilas in the Diamer
district of the Northern Areas.111 The dispute over the
name of the dam may have been resolved112 but the far
more serious issue of royalties is still contested.
In Gilgit in July 2006, Musharraf said the Northern Areas
would receive all royalties accruing from the dam.113
Locals, however, are sceptical, given Islamabad’s history
of backtracking on pledges as well as constitutional hurdles.
“Musharraf’s words are not enough”, said a politician. “He
will have to alter Article 161 of the constitution if he is
to live up to his promises”.114 According to Article 161
(2), “the net profits earned by the Federal Government,
or any undertaking established or administered by the
Federal Government from the bulk generation of power
at a hydro-electric station shall be paid to the Province
in which the hydro-electric station is situated”. Although
108 Crisis Group interview, Hafeez-ur-Rehman, Islamabad,
August 2006.
109 “Northern Areas council will be made an assembly: minister”,
Daily Times, 18 January 2007.
110 “Experts find Bhasha dam best choice”, Dawn, 15 June
2004.
111 Javed Mahmood, “Water crisis to start from 2012”, The
Nation, 19 January 2006.
112 Only 1 per cent of the dam will be in Bhasha, a village in
NWFP’s Kohistan district; the rest will be constructed almost
entirely in the Northern Areas. In February 2006 the government,
accepting the demands of locals in Diamer, who will be the
most affected by its construction, changed the dam’s name to
Diamer-Bhasha.
113 “Northern Areas to get dam royalty”, Dawn, 6 July 2006.
114 Crisis Group interview, Syed Jaffar Shah, Gilgit, August
2006.
Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas
Crisis Group Asia Report N°131, 2 April 2007 Page 15
almost all the project’s land is in the Northern Areas, the
power station will be built in Bhasha, NWFP, causing
locals to fear they will lose their land and gain nothing
in return.115
Article 161 makes provinces the rightful recipients
of royalties but confers no such benefit on federally
administered territories like the Northern Areas, which
is at a distinct disadvantage in any dispute with NWFP.
“How can Pakistan apply the provisions of its constitution
to a matter affecting the Northern Areas when it regards
the region as disputed territory? A constitutional
arrangement of some sort must be made with the people
of the region before work begins on the dam”, said an
analyst.116
Haider Khan, an NALC member from Diamer, whose
constituents are most directly affected by the dam’s
construction, warned that Pakistan must not go ahead
without taking into account the Northern Areas’ legitimate
concerns. “We can make sacrifices if it is in the larger
interest of the country but have certain conditions for the
government which must be met or there will be strong and
even violent protest”.117 Those conditions include payment
of all royalties to the Northern Areas, reallocation and
adequate compensation for those affected by construction
and recruitment of locals for all positions that do not require
technical expertise. Since the federal government is unlikely
to accept these demands, the project could lead to strife.
115 Safdar Khan, “Threat to launch movement against Bhasha
dam”, Dawn, 21 January 2006.
116 Crisis Group interview, Afzal Shigri, Islamabad, September
2006.
117 Crisis Group interview, Islamabad, July 2006.
V. THE SECTARIAN MENACE
By denying the Northern Areas a constitutional identity,
administering it through a highly centralised bureaucracy
and depriving its residents of political rights and recourse
to justice, Pakistan has created an environment in which
increasing numbers, particularly youth, have no outlet to
express themselves except through sectarian violence.
“Sectarianism has provided a convenient outlet for releasing
the frustration engendered by political neglect”, said the
local PML-N leader, Hafeez-ur-Rehman. “Wherever there
is a lingering sense of deprivation, the eventual outcome
can only be chaos and destruction”.118 An NALC member
added: ““Religious extremism always emerges from the
womb of military rule”.119
A. ORIGINS OF SECTARIAN STRIFE
The Northern Areas are the only Shia-majority region
under Pakistan’s control. In an estimated population of
approximately 1.5 million, around 39 per cent is Shia,
27 per cent Sunni, 18 per cent Ismaili and 16 per cent
Nurbakhshi.120 Five of the six districts have populations
heavily dominated by one sect. Sectarian strife in those
districts is rare. In Gilgit, the region’s nerve centre, the
sects are far more evenly balanced. State and non-state
actors have manipulated the divisions there since the
1980s, sowing the seeds of sectarian discord.
1. Zia-ul-Haq and state-sponsored sectarianism
During the 1980s, General Zia-ul-Haq made Islamisation
the basis of state policy with the dual goals of legitimising
military rule and promoting the military’s jihads in
Afghanistan and Indian-administered Kashmir. His religious
allies of choice were the Sunni Islamist parties and groups,
particularly the anti-Shia Deobandis. To counter the rising
tide of Shia Islam in neighbouring Iran following the Islamic
118 Crisis Group interview, Islamabad, July 2006.
119 Crisis Group interview, member of the NALC, Islamabad,
December 2006.
120 Figures obtained from Manzoom Ali, Atlas of the Northern
Areas (Gilgit, 2004). Most locals consider this publication the
most accurate account of the Northern Areas’ sectarian profile.
According to it, Gilgit district is 54 per cent Shia, 27 per cent
Ismaili and 19 per cent Sunni; Skardu district is 87 per cent Shia,
10 per cent Nurbakhshi and 3 per cent Sunni; Diamer district is
90 per cent Sunni and 10 per cent Shia; Ghizer district is 87 per
cent Ismaili and 13 per cent Sunni; and Ghangche district is 87
per cent Nurbakhshi, 8 per cent Sunni and 5 per cent Shia. The
district of Astore, carved out of Diamer district in 2005 and
created after the publication of the Atlas, is believed to be 70 per
cent Sunni and 30 per cent Shia.
Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas
Crisis Group Asia Report N°131, 2 April 2007 Page 16
Revolution of 1979, he also engineered a “dramatic shift
towards extremist Sunni political discourse, orthodoxy and
a heightening of anti-Shia militancy, early signs of
the bloody sectarian conflict to follow”.121 The Zia era
witnessed the creation of some of Pakistan’s most militant
anti-Shia groups such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan
(SSP). His aggressive Sunni Islamisation drive resulted
in a Shia backlash, setting the stage for bloody sectarian
violence.
In the Shia-majority Northern Areas, sectarian tensions
transformed into violent conflict during the last days of Zia’s
rule. In May 1988, Sunni zealots, predominantly from
NWFP’s tribal areas, assisted by local Sunnis from Chilas,
Darel and Tangir, attacked several Shia villages on the
outskirts of Gilgit.122 For three days, they killed, looted
and pillaged with impunity while the authorities sat back
and watched. Although contingents of the paramilitary
Frontier Constabulary (FC) were eventually sent in, they
too looked the other way while Sunni attackers wreaked
havoc. By the time army units were sent in to quell the
violence, at least 150 people were killed, several hundred
injured and property worth millions of rupees destroyed.123
“The attack was entirely government sponsored, or how
else could the invaders have been, first, allowed unhindered
passage from NWFP right up to Gilgit and, secondly,
permitted to commit the carnage that they did?”, asked a
Shia religious leader from Jalalabad, one of the villages
razed to the ground.124 Sunnis deny government complicity
and insist both sides were at fault. “The administration did
nothing to prevent the riots of 1988 but to say that it was
actively involved would be untrue. It was more a case of
gross negligence than active complicity”, a Sunni leader
maintained. However, he conceded: “Zia let the Sunni
121 Crisis Group Report, The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan,
op. cit. Until 1990, the SSP and the Shia Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-
Fiqah-e-Jaafria (TNFJ) were the country’s primary sectarian
protagonists. In 1990, following the murder of SSP founder Haq
Nawaz Jhangvi, the SSP created an even more militant wing,
the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ). The Shias countered by forming the
Sipah-e-Muhammad (SMP) in the early 1990s.
122 The attack was triggered by a quarrel between Shias and
Sunnis in Gilgit. On 17 May 1988, Shias celebrated Eid-ul-
Fitr, the festival marking the end of the Muslim fasting month,
Ramadan, a day earlier than the Sunnis. Sunnis, who were still
fasting, clashed with Shias, as a result of which a Shia student
leader was seriously wounded. As violence escalated, two
people were killed. After news of the violence spread to other
parts of the region and beyond, Sunni mullahs in NWFP
declared a jihad against Shias and called on volunteers to join.
A.H. Sorbo, “Paradise Lost”, The Herald, June 1988, p. 31,
123 Ibid.
124 Crisis Group interview, Sheikh Nayyar Abbas, Gilgit,
August 2006.
mosques say and do what they pleased and allowed the
Sunni mullahs to fill the power vacuum in the region”.125
Sectarian tensions had increased following construction
of the Karakoram Highway in 1986 and the opening of
trade through the China border, which resulted in Sunni
settlers from NWFP and Punjab establishing flourishing
businesses in Gilgit, altering its demographic balance
and incurring Shia resentment. Prior to 1988, sectarian
tensions were rare and did not result in armed conflict.
Shias and Sunnis had coexisted peacefully.126
Intermarriages were frequent, and the resultant ties
of kinship took precedence over sectarian differences.
Historically, too, ethnic ties and tribal loyalties were
more important than sectarian identities. After 1988,
however, Gilgit gradually changed from a peaceful
tourist destination into a battleground for Sunni and
Shia militants.
During the democratic interlude of the 1990s, Gilgit
was not free from sectarian strife127 but representative
institutions and responsive civilian governments still
ensured an uneasy sectarian peace. Disillusioned with
Islamabad and motivated by the need to unite on a common
platform to ensure their collective survival, Shias in the
region supported the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Fiqah-e-Jafria
(TNFJ), initially a religious organisation but transformed,
through sheer numbers, into a formidable political force.128
The TNFJ, and the Shia community as a whole, boycotted
elections to the Northern Areas Council in 1991, accusing
KANA minister Sardar Mehtab Abbassi of redrawing
constituencies in Gilgit to favour the Sunnis. In 1994,
however, soon after the passage of the LFO and concerned
about Shia alienation, Islamabad held early elections in
which the TNFJ won ten of 24 seats and was included
in a coalition government.129 Although Islamabad’s
decision to make concessions to a local religious party,
rather than strengthening moderate political forces, was
troublesome, it did help to lessen Shia alienation.
The Pakistan military’s internal and external preferences,
however, were to widen the sectarian divide. Despite the
restoration of civilian rule, it retained absolute control
over all sensitive aspects of domestic and foreign policy
125 Crisis Group interview, Raja Nisar Wali, Gilgit, August
2006.
126 In Crisis Group interviews, many locals recalled nostalgically
when Sunnis in Gilgit served refreshments to Shias during
the Ashura procession, which commemorates the martyrdom
of Hussein, son of Ali and grandson of the Prophet.
127 According to figures provided to Crisis Group by the
Northern Areas police, there was a progressive increase in
sectarian murders between 1990 and 1992, with seven in 1990,
twelve in 1991, and 30 in 1992; in 1993 they decreased to twenty.
128 Crisis Group interview, Shia educator, Gilgit, October 2006.
129 Ibid.
Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas
Crisis Group Asia Report N°131, 2 April 2007 Page 17
in the 1990s, including relations with Afghanistan and
India. Its reliance on jihadis to promote and protect
Pakistan’s perceived regional interests directly impacted
on the Northern Areas’ sectarian environment. Many
local Sunnis who had participated in the anti-Soviet jihad
in Afghanistan returned home to join anti-Shia sectarian
groups like the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and the Lashkare-
Jhangvi. Local Shia graduates from Iran’s religious
schools also returned. With Iranian financial backing and
support, they joined Shia militant organisations.
The military’s reliance on jihadis in its proxy war with
India over Kashmir added a new dimension to sectarian
conflict in the Northern Areas. In the 1990s, bastions of
Sunni conservatism in the Northern Areas such as Chilas,
Darel and Tangir became training grounds for the Kashmir
jihad. Jihadi presence in the region increased markedly
during the 1999 Kargil conflict, when then-Army Chief
Musharraf sent troops from the Northern Light Infantry
and jihadi fighters across the Line of Control into Indianadministered
Kashmir.130 Extremist outfits such as the
Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, Jaish-e-Muhammad and Harkatul
Mujahideen opened offices in the Northern Areas, which
became hubs of jihadi training as well as anti-Shia
activism.131 Despite the Musharraf government’s ban on
many of these groups, they still operate freely under
changed names.
Since Islamabad is seen as incapable or unwilling to protect
them,132 the Shias have armed themselves. Retired Shia
army officers and soldiers are training young fighters to
defend their community against Sunni adversaries.133 Since
local Sunnis, backed by non-local Sunni jihadis, are also
heavily armed, sectarian conflict has assumed a particularly
dangerous form. Sophisticated weaponry, including AK-
47 assault rifles and rocket launchers, are pouring into an
area where they were previously unknown, raising the
threat and level of sectarian violence.134
B. DYNAMICS OF THE SECTARIAN DIVIDE
Islamabad’s patronage of hardline Sunnis and failure
to address minority grievances in the Northern Areas
still provokes sectarian violence, as demonstrated by
130 See Crisis Group Report, Confrontation and Miscalculation,
op. cit.
131 Crisis Group Report, The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan,
op. cit.
132 Some locals consider Islamabad complicit since it arrested
no one after the 1988 attack.
133 Crisis Group interview, Shia politician, Gilgit, October 2006.
134 A security official said some law-enforcement personnel
were complicit in the arms trade, smuggling arms from NWFP
and selling them at inflated prices in Gilgit, Crisis Group
interview, Gilgit, August 2006.
the follow-up to a dispute over the religious context
of textbooks.
1. The textbook issue
Sectarian violence erupted in the Northern Areas in 1999
after the federal education ministry introduced amended
textbooks produced by the Punjab Textbook Board which,
Shias believed, contained material that promoted Sunni
beliefs and practices and distorted the Shia view of Islamic
history. Agha Ziauddin Rizvi, head cleric of the main Shia
mosque in Gilgit, demanded the public school curriculum
be purged of all contentious material or, if that was
not possible, Shias be permitted their own curriculum.135
Establishing peace committees, the local administration
first gave in and then backtracked on assurances that Shia
demands would be met.136 With the federal government
also ignoring Shia demands, Shia and Sunni students in a
Gilgit high school clashed in 2001, followed by districtwide
demonstrations, strikes and protests.
In May 2004, local communities agreed on separate Islamic
Studies courses for Shia and Sunni students, signifying
their willingness to resolve differences peacefully, but the
federal ministry of education refused to withdraw the
contentious material. Strikes and protest demonstrations by
Shias soon brought Gilgit to a standstill. The government
responded by large-scale arrests of school children as well
as the top Shia leadership. “The FCNA (Force Command
Northern Areas) commander ordered these arrests even
though we had advised against it on the ground that it would
lead to violence”, said a Sunni member of the NALC.137
The army was called out and a curfew imposed early on 3
June. However, thousands of Shia protestors, enraged by
the arrest of their leaders, defied the curfew; violent clashes
with security forces left six dead, over 40 injured and
official property worth millions of rupees destroyed.138
Islamabad then agreed on an interim formula. Shia and
Sunni students would have their own curriculum in
schools where they were the majority sects; in others, the
religious beliefs of each sect would be respected. This
temporarily dampened violence139 but sentiments
remained high, and even bureaucrats displayed partiality.
“Government officials themselves were giving advance
135 For instance, Urdu textbooks for grades two and three
described only the Sunni method of performing prayers; Sunni
historical personalities, some of whom Shias considered
usurpers, were exalted, while their Shia counterparts were ignored.
Crisis Group interview, Shiekh Nayyar Abbas, Gilgit, August
2006.
136 Farman Ali, “Studied Silence”, The Herald, February 2006.
137 Crisis Group interview, Islamabad, December 2006.
138 The curfew remained in force for thirteen days.
139 “N. Areas’ syllabus issue resolved”, Dawn, 6 June 2004.
Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas
Crisis Group Asia Report N°131, 2 April 2007 Page 18
warnings to the Shia mosques of every step the government
was planning to take”.140
On 8 January 2005, Ziauddin Rizvi, the driving force
behind Shia activism in the Northern Areas, was critically
injured in an attack. His bodyguards killed one of the
assailants, identified as Mukhtar Ahmed, a FATA resident
and member of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. Enraged Shias took
to the streets in Gilgit, destroying government and private
property. A district forest officer and six others were burned
alive in an attack on his house, and the Sunni director of
the local health department was shot dead in his office. At
least fifteen people were killed and scores injured before
the government imposed a shoot-on-sight curfew. The
riots spread to Skardu, where hundreds of Shias protested,
attacking government property and blocking roads.
On 12 January, Rizvi succumbed to his injuries, triggering
more violent protests. Although leaders of the two
main religious groupings in the Northern Areas, the Shia
Anjuman-i-Islami and the Sunni Tehreek Ahl-e-Sunnat
Wal Jamaat, signed an agreement brokered by the NALC
to restore peace, neither side was sincere. The tit-fortat
killings that followed included the assassination of
Sakhiullah Tareen, the Northern Areas police chief at the
time of Rizvi’s assassination.
On 26 April 2005, the federal minister for education, Lt.
General (ret.) Javed Ashraf Qazi chaired a high-level
committee meeting that decided the Punjab Textbook
Board’s contentious textbooks would be withdrawn and
replaced with those published by the NWFP Textbook
Board and the National Book Foundation. Qazi also assured
the committee, which had three representatives from the
Northern Areas, that all controversial contents of Islamic
Studies and Urdu textbooks would be withdrawn in the
revised national curriculum.141 However, the education
minister has not delivered on his pledge to replace the
flawed national curriculum with revised textbooks from
which all contentious sectarian material has been removed.
The old textbooks, with minor modifications, are still used
in the region, although the controversial chapters are not
taught.142 And even if the textbook issue is finally resolved,
this will not by itself end sectarian discord in the Northern
Areas.
140 Crisis Group interview, Gilgit, October 2006.
141 “NAs curriculum issue resolved; Schools open today”,
Dawn, 27 April 2005.
142 Sources in the ministry of education told Crisis Group a
new scheme of studies has been prepared but would not be
made public until sometime in 2007.
2. Restoring the peace
A day after the education ministry declared that the
textbook issue had been “amicably” resolved,143 four Shias
were shot and injured during a religious ceremony on Eid
Milad-un-Nabi, the Prophet’s birthday, that was opposed
by hardline Sunnis.144 In less acrimonious times, Sunnis
had even participated in such Shia rituals but the divide is
now too wide. The military government has extended it by
marginalising moderate forces, weakening even nominally
elected forums, and resorting to brute force to suppress
the resultant discord. The result of the military’s policies
is the empowerment of militants in the Northern Areas
and an incremental weakening of Islamabad’s legitimacy
and authority.
This was amply demonstrated in October 2005, when Gilgit
was again transformed into a virtual battlefield, with
the Shia community pitted against the Pakistan Rangers,
a paramilitary force of the federal government.145 On 11
October, following an armed attack in Baseen on the
outskirts of Gilgit on a bus carrying mainly Shia passengers
that killed one and injured several, the Rangers took one
of the assailants captured by the police into their custody,
raising doubts about their neutrality. As he was being
transferred from Gilgit’s District Headquarters Hospital to
the Combined Military Hospital, Shia students confronted
the Rangers, and both sides resorted to violence.146 Two
Rangers were killed, as were ten innocent bystanders after
the Rangers used indiscriminate force.147 Another curfew
was imposed, schools closed and four Shia and four Sunni
leaders arrested under the Anti-Terrorism Act.
Excessive force and random arrests are unlikely to dampen
sectarian violence. What is needed instead is rule of law
and an end to the climate of impunity. But Islamabad has
yet to hold security officials accountable for excessive force
or bring those responsible for committing or instigating
sectarian violence to justice. A sustainable peace is also
viable only if the Northern Areas’ elected institutions and
judiciary are sufficiently empowered. Marginalised by
Islamabad, however, the NALC and the judiciary remain
143 “NAs curriculum issue resolved; Schools open today”,
Dawn, 27 April 2005.
144 Sunnis in the Northern Areas resent the Shia practice of
lighting fires to commemorate important religious events such
as Eid Milad-un-Nabi on the grounds it takes place on hills
that do not belong to Shias and often overlook Sunni localities.
145 Two units of Rangers have been deployed in Gilgit since 23
March 2005 at an estimated daily cost of $25,000 (1.5 million
rupees), from the Northern Areas’ annual budget. Sarmad
Abbas, “Unending War”, The Herald, November 2005, p. 32.
146 After a Ranger was shot and injured, the Rangers detained
and assaulted the alleged culprit, a Shia student.
147 Crisis Group interview, Syed Jaffar Shah, Gilgit, August
2006.
Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas
Crisis Group Asia Report N°131, 2 April 2007 Page 19
toothless institutions. Following Ziauddin Rizvi’s
assassination and the subsequent violence, for instance,
Islamabad convened a traditional tribal assembly (grand
jirga), composed of representatives from the warring
sects, thus sidelining the NALC and further weakening
its credibility.148 The jirga drew up a peace agreement
that was signed by the regions’ leading religious leaders.
Those detained in October 2005 signed as well and were
then released.
While there has recently been a lull in violence, sporadic
attacks still take place, and the jirga, which is monitored
by a six-member committee headed by Gilgit’s deputy
commissioner, is not likely to keep the peace for long.149
Jirga members accuse the government of interference150
but the Sunni and Shia mullahs who run it have little interest
in sectarian harmony and have escalated their rhetoric.
Sunni Tehreek Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat chief Qazi Nisar
Ahmed has warned that “if the Shias continue to publicly
hold offensive rituals and disparage our revered religious
personages, then one should not be surprised if a Sunni
takes up his gun and retaliates”.151 Sheikh Nayyar Abbas,
leader of the Shia Anjuman-i-Islami insists there are no
moderate Sunnis in Gilgit, only Wahhabis who denounce
Shias: “When we are called infidels and people who are
detestable to us are publicly venerated, what do you expect
us to do? We cannot abandon our core beliefs simply for
the sake of peace”.152 “The primary purpose of the jirga
was to remove differences and thereby unite the people,
an endeavour in which it has not been successful”, says
Mirza Ali, Anjuman-i-Islami president.153
According to police estimates, there were 68 deaths in
sectarian violence between June 2004 and October 2005
but independent estimates put the figure closer to 100.154
While some arrests were made, there have been no
148 The NALC speaker, Malik Miskeen, presided over the jirga.
He is a Sunni hardliner believed to have played a leading role in
supporting NWFP-based Sunni militants who participated in
1988 anti-Shia violence. Crisis Group interviews, Gilgit, August
2006.
149 In April 2006, for instance, a Sunni judge of an anti-terrorist
court in Gilgit was shot dead, reportedly by a Shia inmate he had
sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment for a previous offence
and had escaped. After killing the judge, he surrendered.
150 “Governmental interference in the jirga is pervasive and
has been instrumental in preventing the jirga from securing a
durable peace”, a member claimed, Crisis Group interview,
Gilgit, August 2006.
151 Crisis Group interviews, Gilgit, August 2006.
152 “Crisis Group interview, Gilgit, August 2006.
153 Crisis Group interview, Gilgit, August 2006.
154 Estimates given to Crisis Group by a senior police official
in Gilgit. For independent estimates see Safdar Khan, “Gilgit’s
sectarian conundrum”, Dawn, 30 October 2005; and Gulmina
Bilal, “While Gilgit burns”, The News, 22 November 2005.
convictions. The findings of commissions of inquiry, such
as those formed to investigate Ziauddin Rizvi’s murder
and the October 2005 events, have not been made public.
The latter, led by two members of the Chief Court,
submitted its report to the federal government after
recording the statements of more than 220 witnesses
but is not available despite demands by relatives of the
victims.155
The government’s unwillingness to identify the perpetrators
of sectarian violence has led many locals to question its will
to tackle sectarianism and even to accuse it of complicity.
Many Shias believe the government intentionally dragged
its feet on the textbook issue to sow discord that would
prevent them joining with Sunnis to seek political
and constitutional rights for the Northern Areas. “The
government has intentionally and consciously promoted
sectarianism in order to keep us fractured and thereby
prevent us from demanding our rights”, said Anjuman-i-
Islami’s Mirza Ali.156 Such criticism is far more muted
among local Sunnis, many of whom believe the Shias went
too far in their demands on the syllabus.157 Nevertheless,
most agree that the manner in which the government went
about resolving the issue left much to be desired.
Many locals are critical of Islamabad’s failure to prevent
sectarian violence, despite the presence of multiple
intelligence agencies158 and security forces, including the
Northern Light Infantry, Rangers, Frontier Constabulary
and Northern Areas Scouts. Yet even the residents of Gilgit
city could not be protected during the 2005 sectarian riots.
Disarmament drives have been launched with much fanfare
but little follow-through. There are weapons in almost
every home in Gilgit. Despite scores of military and police
checkpoints, arms and narcotics still flow unabated into
the Northern Areas.
155 “Inquiry report on Gilgit clashes submitted”, Dawn, 6
January 2006.
156 Crisis Group interview, Gilgit, August 2006.
157 A Sunni politician closely involved in the textbook issue said
the Shias had 74 objections, eventually reduced to 37, but only
one, relating to the Sunni method of performing prayers, was
justified. Crisis Group interview, Islamabad, December 2006.
158 According to a Crisis Group source, there are almost a dozen
such agencies in the region, including Inter-Services Intelligence,
Military Intelligence, Intelligence Bureau, Criminal Investigation
Department and Special Branch.
Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas
Crisis Group Asia Report N°131, 2 April 2007 Page 20
VI. ALTERING THE STATUS QUO
A. THE NATIONALIST CHALLENGE
Pakistan’s unwillingness to give the Northern Areas
a constitutional identity and political rights has created a
potentially powerful nationalist movement, which seeks
to sever the Kashmir connection and obtain self-rule and
eventually independence.159 It rejects the term “Northern
Areas” as an invention of Pakistani “colonialists” and
favours the historical name, Balawaristan.160 This
movement gained momentum after the Kargil conflict of
1999, when the army failed to acknowledge publicly
the contributions of local Northern Light Infantry troops,
many of whom were killed, passing them off as Kashmiri
freedom fighters. Since then nationalist organisations such
as the Balawaristan National Front (BNF), the Karakoram
National Movement (KNM) and the Gilgit-Baltistan
United Alliance (GBUA) have organised and become
increasingly vociferous in demanding greater political
rights and diminished Pakistani control. “There should be
no two opinions about the fact that Pakistan has conquered
us and exploited us. The state itself has compelled us to
seek our independence”, stressed a nationalist leader. 161
Most locals appear still wedded to a future with Pakistan.
However, since the nationalist parties are not allowed to
contest elections, it is difficult to gauge the extent to which
their cause has popular support. One sympathiser maintains
that if the nationalists were allowed to stand in free and
fair elections under their party banners, they would secure
a comfortable majority.162
Nationalists attribute the absence of public demonstrations
of support to fear of retribution. “Our leaders have been
killed, forced to commit suicide and tortured”, said KNM
General Secretary Amjad Changezi. “People are too afraid
to support us openly but our estimate is that 90 per cent
of the region’s youth sympathises with our cause”.163
According to another nationalist leader, hundreds of
nationalists had been implicated in false sedition cases
and subjected to torture, harassment and illegal detention,
but the “movement for self-rule is still gaining strength”.164
159 A minority of nationalists, such as those belonging to the
Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), supports the Northern
Areas becoming part of an independent Jammu and Kashmir.
160 In medieval times, the region was called Bolor, or Balawar.
See Dani, op. cit.
161 Crisis Group interview, Amjad Changezi, General Secretary,
Karakoram National Movement (KNM), Gilgit, August 2006.
162 Crisis Group interview, Farman Ali, Islamabad, December
2006.
163 Crisis Group interview, Gilgit, August 2006.
164 Crisis Group interview, Islamabad, December 2006.
While the vast majority in the Northern Areas might
see independence as neither realistic nor desirable, the
nationalists’ insistence on some form of self-rule has
certainly struck a chord. For instance, BNF’s president
Nawaz Khan Naji contested the 2004 NALC elections
as an independent candidate and lost “by only 1,000 votes
to a local feudal baron who has never lost an election and
who commands huge financial resources”.165 Nationalists
admit their cause has been damaged by some of its leaders,
such as Muzzaffar Rellay, former KNM chairman, who
was elected from Astore in 2004 as an independent
candidate on a nationalist platform but left his party to
join the PML-Q after being offered an adviser’s post.
But they insist they remain a strong force. Naji maintains
they have a healthy presence in local councils and other
municipal bodies, and their support base is steadily
expanding.166
Their opponents accuse the nationalists of internal disunity
and insincerity. “Had they been sincere to their cause, they
would have a single unified party. Instead, they have
split up into different groups”, said a Gilgit lawyer.167
Nationalists, however, insist their differences are minor,
and they are united in their ultimate objective of
independence.168 While the nationalists are still relatively
weak, their challenge to Pakistan’s control should not be
dismissed lightly. The longer Pakistan denies the region
political freedoms, the more the nationalists stand to gain.
B. OPTIONS FOR THE NORTHERN AREAS
There is vigorous debate in the Northern Areas on
options to end constitutional ambiguity and political
disempowerment.
Provincial Status. Those who reject the connection with
Kashmir and support full integration with Pakistan advocate
this. If Pakistan refuses lest its stand on Kashmir be
weakened, advocates say, it should then give the Northern
Areas provisional provincial status so they could enjoy
the same rights as Pakistan’s four provinces, while still
being able to participate in any future negotiations on
Kashmir. Shias and Ismailis support this option but many
local Shias believe Sunni-majority Pakistan is uncomfortable
with the prospect of a Shia-majority province.
Merger with AJK. Some Sunnis support merger of the
Northern Areas with Azad Jammu and Kashmir. They
165 Crisis Group interview, Nawaz Khan Naji, Gilgit, August
2006.
166 Crisis Group interview, Gilgit, August 2006.
167 Crisis Group interview, Gilgit, August 2006.
168 Crisis Group interviews, Mumtaz Nagri, chairman KNM,
and Amjad Changezi, Gilgit, August 2006.
Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas
Crisis Group Asia Report N°131, 2 April 2007 Page 21
argue that Pakistan would be best served not just by
retaining but also formalising the Kashmir connection.
This could be best done by merging the Northern Areas
into AJK, the other part of Kashmiri territory under its
control. Shias and Ismailis oppose a merger with the
culturally dissimilar and overwhelmingly Sunni AJK.
Independence. Advocates are divided into two categories:
pro-Kashmiri nationalists, who want the Northern Areas
to become part of an independent Kashmir, and anti-
Kashmir nationalists, who want to sever links with both
AJK and Pakistan.
An AJK-like status. Shias, Sunnis and Ismailis tend
to agree the Northern Areas deserve at least the same
political, administrative and judicial arrangements as exist
in AJK. At the same time, there is support, across the
political, sectarian and ethnic divide, for more than just a
façade of autonomy. All moderate political voices strongly
support the creation of governance structures that would
be participatory, representative and accountable.
VII. CONCLUSION
Unless Pakistan takes steps to provide meaningful
autonomy to the Federally Administered Northern Areas,
extending civil and political rights to its people,
grievances will mount. The federal government’s failure
to implement the ruling of Pakistan’s Supreme Court
and grant self-government is largely responsible for
the mounting discord in the region. The imposition of
an unelected and unrepresentative viceroy has seriously
undermined Islamabad’s standing. Pakistan should
consult all stakeholders and ensure that political reforms
are locally driven, not centrally dictated.
The Supreme Court reminded the federal government
that the people of the Northern Areas are entitled to
constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights, including
access to justice through an independent judiciary.
Islamabad must respect those fundamental rights and
remove all executive and administrative constraints that
hamper judicial independence. The absence of rule of law
and the climate of impunity has empowered sectarian
extremists, who are also the main beneficiaries of the
democratic deficit. So long as elected institutions remain
impotent and moderate voices are silenced and
marginalised, sectarian extremists are bound to flourish.
The democratic deficit in the Northern Areas will not,
however, be redressed while Pakistan itself remains under
military rule. Alienation and discord in the Northern Areas
had receded under responsive, democratically-elected
governments in Islamabad. In the eighth year of centralised
authoritarian rule, however, Pakistan’s legitimacy in the
region is fast declining. So long as democracy eludes the
country, political empowerment and a durable peace in
the Northern Areas will remain a distant dream.
Islamabad/Brussels, 2 April 2007
Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas
Crisis Group Asia Report N°131, 2 April 2007 Page 22
APPENDIX A
MAP OF PAKISTAN
Qal'eh-ye Now
Zaranj
Meymaneh
Sheberghan
Gardeyz
Parachinar
Kunduz
-
Samanga-n
Kowt-e 'Ashrow
Dadu
Pasni Ormara
Hoshab
Jiwani Gwadar
Turbat Bela
Khuzdar
Panjgur
Dalbandin
Nok Kundi
Zhob
Chaman
Sibi
Shikarpur
Khairpur
Moro
Mirpur Khas
Thatta
Matli
Sanghar
Jacobabad
Saidu
Bannu
Tank
Muzaffarabad Kargil
Sopur
Shujaabad
Skardu
Gilgit
Chitral
Surab
Ratangarh
Barmer
Ramgarh
Palanpur
Jaisalmer
Qala- t
Lashkar Ga-h
Dela-ra-m Fara-h
Tar-in Kowt
Sh-indand
Chaghchara-n
Ba-m-ia-n
Dowshi-
Baghla-n
Ta- loqa-n
Feyza-ba-d
Cha- r-ika- r
Jala- la-ba-d
Baraki-
Ghazni-
Sahiwal
Larkana Sukkur
Dera Ghazi
Khan
Dera Ismail
Khan
Nawabshaw
Jammu
Rajauri
Sialkot
Gujrat
Rawalpindi
Mardan Srinagar
Anantnag
Kulob
Iolotan'
Qarshi
Mary Kerki
Khorugh
Qurghonteppa
Termiz
Rahimyar Khan
Bahawalpur
Chandigarh
Multan
Ludhiana
Amritsar
Bhatinda
Patiala
Bikaner
Jhang Sadr
Kasur
Gujranwala
Sargodha
Ajmer
Udaipur
Kota
Jaipur
Jodhbur
Bhavnagar
Rajkot
Diu
Bhuj
Jamnagar
Mazar-e
Sharif
-
Hyderabad
Hera- t
Kandaha- r
Karachi
Lahore
Quetta
Peshawar
Delhi
Faisalabad
Ahmadabad
Islamabad
Dushanbe
New Delhi
Kabol
(Kabul)
-
- - -
BALOCHISTAN
S I N D
P U N JAB
NORTH-WEST
FRONTIER
FED.
ADMIN.
TRIBAL
AREAS
FED. CAPITAL
TERRITORY
ISLAMABAD
J a m m u
a n d
K a s h m i r Khyber Pass
H i m a l a y a s
A R A B I A N S E A
Indus
Indus
Ravi
Sutlej
Chenab
Jhelum
Indus
Zhob
Mashkai
Dasht
Rakshan
Harut
- -
Morghab-
Murgab
Amu Darya
Farah-
Helmand
Helmand
Gowd-e Zereh
Sonmiani
Bay
R a n o f K u t c h
Khash -
Rowd-e Lurah -
Arghandab-
Kushka
Darya-ye Panj
Tedzhen
Harirud- -
Pamir
Kunar
G ulf ot Kutch
Gulf of
Khambhat
Hamun-i-
Mashkel
- -
-
Indus
Mouth of the
Nara Canal
Banas
Vakhsh
A F G H A N I S TA N
TURKMENISTAN
TAJIKISTAN
UZBEKISTAN
ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC OF
IRAN I N D I A
CHINA
Mt. Godwin
Austen (K2)
8611 m
National capital
Provincial capital
Town, village
Airports
International boundary
Provincial boundary
Main road
Secondary road
Railroad
PAKISTAN
Map No. 4181 Rev. 1 UNITED NATIONS
January 2004
Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Cartographic Section
PAKISTAN
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used
on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance
by the United Nations.
Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control
in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan.
The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been
agreed upon by the parties.
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 km
0 50 100 150 200 mi
Line Of Control as promulgated in
the 1972 SIMLA Agreement
Lineof Contol
66° 68° 70° 72°
34°
32°
30°
28°
26°
24°
22°
38°
36°
66° 68° 70° 72°
62° 64°
34°
32°
30°
28°
26°
24°
36°
Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas
Crisis Group Asia Report N°131, 2 April 2007 Page 23
APPENDIX B
ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP
The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an
independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation,
with some 130 staff members on five continents, working
through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy
to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.
Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research.
Teams of political analysts are located within or close by
countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of
violent conflict. Based on information and assessments
from the field, it produces analytical reports containing
practical recommendations targeted at key international
decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes CrisisWatch,
a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct
regular update on the state of play in all the most significant
situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world.
Crisis Group’s reports and briefing papers are distributed
widely by email and printed copy to officials in
foreign ministries and international organisations
and made available simultaneously on the website,
www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with
governments and those who influence them, including
the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate
support for its policy prescriptions.
The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent
figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business
and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring
the reports and recommendations to the attention of senior
policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is co-chaired
by the former European Commissioner for External
Relations Christopher Patten and former U.S. Ambassador
Thomas Pickering. Its President and Chief Executive
since January 2000 has been former Australian Foreign
Minister Gareth Evans.
Crisis Group’s international headquarters are in Brussels,
with advocacy offices in Washington DC (where it is based
as a legal entity), New York, London and Moscow. The
organisation currently operates twelve regional offices (in
Amman, Bishkek, Bogotá, Cairo, Dakar, Islamabad,
Istanbul, Jakarta, Nairobi, Pristina, Seoul and Tbilisi) and has
local field representation in sixteen additional locations
(Abuja, Baku, Beirut, Belgrade, Colombo, Damascus, Dili,
Dushanbe, Jerusalem, Kabul, Kampala, Kathmandu,
Kinshasa, Port-au-Prince, Pretoria and Yerevan). Crisis
Group currently covers nearly 60 areas of actual or potential
conflict across four continents. In Africa, this includes
Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Guinea, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan,
Uganda, Western Sahara and Zimbabwe; in Asia,
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kashmir, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar/Burma, Nepal, North Korea,
Pakistan, Phillipines, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-
Leste, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in Europe, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Georgia,
Kosovo and Serbia; in the Middle East, the whole region
from North Africa to Iran; and in Latin America, Colombia,
the rest of the Andean region and Haiti.
Crisis Group raises funds from governments, charitable
foundations, companies and individual donors. The
following governmental departments and agencies
currently provide funding: Australian Agency for
International Development, Austrian Federal Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade, Canadian International Development Agency,
Canadian International Development Research Centre,
Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German Foreign
Office, Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, Japanese
International Cooperation Agency, Principality of
Liechtenstein Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Luxembourg
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New Zealand Agency for
International Development, Royal Danish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Swiss
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Turkish Ministry
of Foreign affairs, United Kingdom Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom Department for
International Development, U.S. Agency for International
Development.
Foundation and private sector donors include Carnegie
Corporation of New York, Carso Foundation, Compton
Foundation, Ford Foundation, Fundación DARA
Internacional, Iara Lee and George Gund III Foundation,
William & Flora Hewlett Foundation, Hunt Alternatives
Fund, Kimsey Foundation, Korea Foundation, John D.
& Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Charles Stewart
Mott Foundation, Open Society Institute, Pierre and
Pamela Omidyar Fund, Victor Pinchuk Foundation,
Ploughshares Fund, Provictimis Foundation, Radcliffe
Foundation, Sigrid Rausing Trust, Rockefeller Philanthropy
Advisors and Viva Trust.
April 2007
Further information about Crisis Group can be obtained from our website: www.crisisgroup.org
Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas
Crisis Group Asia Report N°131, 2 April 2007 Page 24
APPENDIX C
CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2004
CENTRAL ASIA
The Failure of Reform in Uzbekistan: Ways Forward for the
International Community, Asia Report N°76, 11 March 2004
(also available in Russian)
Tajikistan’s Politics: Confrontation or Consolidation?, Asia
Briefing Nº33, 19 May 2004
Political Transition in Kyrgyzstan: Problems and Prospects,
Asia Report N°81, 11 August 2004
Repression and Regression in Turkmenistan: A New
International Strategy, Asia Report N°85, 4 November 2004
(also available in Russian)
The Curse of Cotton: Central Asia’s Destructive Monoculture,
Asia Report N°93, 28 February 2005 (also available in Russian)
Kyrgyzstan: After the Revolution, Asia Report N°97, 4 May
2005 (also available in Russian)
Uzbekistan: The Andijon Uprising, Asia Briefing N°38, 25 May
2005 (also available in Russian)
Kyrgyzstan: A Faltering State, Asia Report N°109, 16 December
2005 (also available in Russian)
Uzbekistan: In for the Long Haul, Asia Briefing N°45, 16
February 2006
Central Asia: What Role for the European Union?, Asia Report
N°113, 10 April 2006
Kyrgyzstan’s Prison System Nightmare, Asia Report N°118,
16 August 2006 (also available in Russian)
Uzbekistan: Europe’s Sanctions Matter, Asia Briefing N°54,
6 November 2006
Kyrgyzstan on the Edge, Asia Briefing N°55, 9 November 2006
Turkmenistan after Niyazov, Asia Briefing N°60, 12 February
2007
NORTH EAST ASIA
Taiwan Strait IV: How an Ultimate Political Settlement Might
Look, Asia Report N°75, 26 February 2004
North Korea: Where Next for the Nuclear Talks?, Asia Report
N°87, 15 November 2004 (also available in Korean and in Russian)
Korea Backgrounder: How the South Views its Brother from
Another Planet, Asia Report N°89, 14 December 2004 (also
available in Korean and in Russian)
North Korea: Can the Iron Fist Accept the Invisible Hand?,
Asia Report N°96, 25 April 2005 (also available in Korean and
in Russian)
Japan and North Korea: Bones of Contention, Asia Report
Nº100, 27 June 2005 (also available in Korean)
China and Taiwan: Uneasy Détente, Asia Briefing N°42, 21
September 2005
North East Asia’s Undercurrents of Conflict, Asia Report N°108,
15 December 2005 (also available in Korean)
China and North Korea: Comrades Forever?, Asia Report N°112,
1 February 2006 (also available in Korean)
After North Korea’s Missile Launch: Are the Nuclear Talks
Dead?, Asia Briefing N°52, 9 August 2006 (also available in
Korean and in Russian)
Perilous Journeys: The Plight of North Koreans in China and
Beyond, Asia Report N°122, 26 October 2006 (also available in
Russian)
North Korea’s Nuclear Test: The Fallout, Asia Briefing N°56, 13
November 2006
SOUTH ASIA
Unfulfilled Promises: Pakistan’s Failure to Tackle Extremism,
Asia Report N°73, 16 January 2004
Nepal: Dangerous Plans for Village Militias, Asia Briefing
Nº30, 17 February 2004 (also available in Nepali)
Devolution in Pakistan: Reform or Regression?, Asia Report
N°77, 22 March 2004
Elections and Security in Afghanistan, Asia Briefing Nº31, 30
March 2004
India/Pakistan Relations and Kashmir: Steps toward Peace,
Asia Report Nº79, 24 June 2004
Pakistan: Reforming the Education Sector, Asia Report N°84,
7 October 2004
Building Judicial Independence in Pakistan, Asia Report N°86,
10 November 2004
Afghanistan: From Presidential to Parliamentary Elections,
Asia Report N°88, 23 November 2004
Nepal’s Royal Coup: Making a Bad Situation Worse, Asia
Report N°91, 9 February 2005
Afghanistan: Getting Disarmament Back on Track, Asia Briefing
N°35, 23 February 2005
Nepal: Responding to the Royal Coup, Asia Briefing N°35,
24 February 2005
Nepal: Dealing with a Human Rights Crisis, Asia Report N°94,
24 March 2005
The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan, Asia Report N°95, 18
April 2005
Political Parties in Afghanistan, Asia Briefing N°39, 2 June 2005
Towards a Lasting Peace in Nepal: The Constitutional Issues,
Asia Report N°99, 15 June 2005
Afghanistan Elections: Endgame or New Beginning?, Asia
Report N°101, 21 July 2005
Nepal: Beyond Royal Rule, Asia Briefing N°41, 15 September 2005
Authoritarianism and Political Party Reform in Pakistan¸
Asia Report N°102, 28 September 2005
Nepal’s Maoists: Their Aims, Structure and Strategy, Asia
Report N°104, 27 October 2005
Pakistan’s Local Polls: Shoring Up Military Rule, Asia Briefing
N°43, 22 November 2005
Nepal’s New Alliance: The Mainstream Parties and the Maoists,
Asia Report 106, 28 November 2005
Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas
Crisis Group Asia Report N°131, 2 April 2007 Page 25
Rebuilding the Afghan State: The European Union’s Role,
Asia Report N°107, 30 November 2005
Nepal: Electing Chaos, Asia Report N°111, 31 January 2006
Pakistan: Political Impact of the Earthquake, Asia Briefing
N°46, 15 March 2006
Nepal’s Crisis: Mobilising International Influence, Asia Briefing
N°49, 19 April 2006
Nepal: From People Power to Peace?, Asia Report N°115, 10
May 2006
Afghanistan’s New Legislature: Making Democracy Work, Asia
Report N°116, 15 May 2006
India, Pakistan and Kashmir: Stabilising a Cold Peace, Asia
Briefing N°51, 15 June 2006
Pakistan: the Worsening Conflict in Balochistan, Asia Report
N°119, 14 September 2006
Bangladesh Today, Asia Report N°121, 23 October 2006
Countering Afghanistan’s Insurgency: No Quick Fixes, Asia
Report N°123, 2 November 2006
Sri Lanka: The Failure of the Peace Process, Asia Report
N°124, 28 November 2006
Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants, Asia Report
N°125, 11 December 2006
Nepal’s Peace Agreement: Making it Work, Asia Report Nº126,
15 December 2006
Afghanistan’s Endangered Compact, Asia Briefing Nº59, 29
January 2007
Nepal’s Constitutional Process, Asia Report N°128, 26 February
2007
Pakistan: Karachi’s Madrasas and Violent Extremism, Asia
Report N°130, 29 March 2007
SOUTH EAST ASIA
Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi, Asia
Report N°74, 3 February 2004
Myanmar: Sanctions, Engagement or Another Way Forward?,
Asia Report N°78, 26 April 2004
Indonesia: Violence Erupts Again in Ambon, Asia Briefing
N°32, 17 May 2004
Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace
Process, Asia Report N°80, 13 July 2004 (also available in
Indonesian)
Myanmar: Aid to the Border Areas, Asia Report N°82, 9
September 2004
Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly
Don’t Mix, Asia Report N°83, 13 September 2004
Burma/Myanmar: Update on HIV/AIDS policy, Asia Briefing
Nº34, 16 December 2004
Indonesia: Rethinking Internal Security Strategy, Asia Report
N°90, 20 December 2004
Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the
Australian Embassy Bombing, Asia Report N°92, 22 February
2005 (also available in Indonesian)
Decentralisation and Conflict in Indonesia: The Mamasa
Case, Asia Briefing N°37, 3 May 2005
Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad, Asia Report N°98,
18 May 2005 (also available in Thai)
Aceh: A New Chance for Peace, Asia Briefing N°40, 15 August 2005
Weakening Indonesia’s Mujahidin Networks: Lessons from
Maluku and Poso, Asia Report N°103, 13 October 2005 (also
available in Indonesian)
Thailand’s Emergency Decree: No Solution, Asia Report
N°105, 18 November 2005 (also available in Thai)
Aceh: So far, So Good, Asia Update Briefing N°44, 13 December
2005 (also available in Indonesian)
Philippines Terrorism: The Role of Militant Islamic Converts,
Asia Report Nº110, 19 December 2005
Papua: The Dangers of Shutting Down Dialogue, Asia Briefing
N°47, 23 March 2006 (also available in Indonesian)
Aceh: Now for the Hard Part, Asia Briefing N°48, 29 March 2006
Managing Tensions on the Timor-Leste/Indonesia Border,
Asia Briefing N°50, 4 May 2006
Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin’s Networks, Asia Report N°114,
5 May 2006 (also available in Indonesian)
Islamic Law and Criminal Justice in Aceh, Asia Report N°117,
31 July 2006 (also available in Indonesian)
Papua: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, Asia Briefing
N°53, 5 September 2006
Resolving Timor-Leste’s Crisis, Asia Report N°120, 10 October
2006
Aceh’s Local Elections: The Role of the Free Aceh Movement
(GAM), Asia Briefing N°57, 29 November 2006
Myanmar: New Threats to Humanitarian Aid, Asia Briefing
N°58, 8 December 2006
Jihadism in Indonesia: Poso on the Edge, Asia Report N°127,
24 January 2007
Southern Thailand: The Impact of the Coup, Asia Report
N°129, 15 March 2007
Indonesia: How GAM Won in Aceh , Asia Briefing N°61, 21
March 2007
OTHER REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS
For Crisis Group reports and briefing papers on:
• Africa
• Europe
• Latin America and Caribbean
• Middle East and North Africa
• Thematic Issues
• CrisisWatch
please visit our website www.crisisgroup.org
Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas
Crisis Group Asia Report N°131, 2 April 2007 Page 26
APPENDIX D
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES
Co-Chairs
Christopher Patten
Former European Commissioner for External Relations,
Governor of Hong Kong and UK Cabinet Minister; Chancellor of
Oxford University
Thomas Pickering
Former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Russia, India, Israel, Jordan,
El Salvador and Nigeria
President & CEO
Gareth Evans
Former Foreign Minister of Australia
Executive Committee
Cheryl Carolus
Former South African High Commissioner to the UK and
Secretary General of the ANC
Maria Livanos Cattaui*
Member of the Board of Directors, Petroplus Holding AG,
Switzerland; former Secretary-General, International Chamber of
Commerce
Yoichi Funabashi
Chief Diplomatic Correspondent & Columnist, The Asahi Shimbun,
Japan
Frank Giustra
Chairman, Endeavour Financial, Canada
Stephen Solarz
Former U.S. Congressman
George Soros
Chairman, Open Society Institute
Pär Stenbäck
Former Foreign Minister of Finland
*Vice-Chair
Morton Abramowitz
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State and Ambassador to Turkey
Adnan Abu-Odeh
Former Political Adviser to King Abdullah II and to King Hussein
and Jordan Permanent Representative to the UN
Kenneth Adelman
Former U.S. Ambassador and Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
Ersin Arioglu
Member of Parliament, Turkey; Chairman Emeritus, Yapi Merkezi
Group
Shlomo Ben-Ami
Former Foreign Minister of Israel
Lakhdar Brahimi
Former Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General and Algerian
Foreign Minister
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Former U.S. National Security Advisor to the President
Kim Campbell
Former Prime Minister of Canada; Secretary General, Club of Madrid
Naresh Chandra
Former Indian Cabinet Secretary and Ambassador of India to the U.S.
Joaquim Alberto Chissano
Former President of Mozambique
Victor Chu
Chairman, First Eastern Investment Group, Hong Kong
Wesley Clark
Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Pat Cox
Former President of European Parliament
Uffe Ellemann-Jensen
Former Foreign Minister of Denmark
Mark Eyskens
Former Prime Minister of Belgium
Joschka Fischer
Former Foreign Minister of Germany
Leslie H. Gelb
President Emeritus of Council on Foreign Relations, U.S.
Carla Hills
Former Secretary of Housing and U.S. Trade Representative
Lena Hjelm-Wallén
Former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister,
Sweden
Swanee Hunt
Chair, The Initiative for Inclusive Security; President, Hunt
Alternatives Fund; former Ambassador U.S. to Austria
Anwar Ibrahim
Former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia
Asma Jahangir
UN Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Religion or Belief;
Chairperson, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
Nancy Kassebaum Baker
Former U.S. Senator
James V. Kimsey
Founder and Chairman Emeritus of America Online, Inc. (AOL)
Wim Kok
Former Prime Minister of Netherlands
Ricardo Lagos
Former President of Chile
Joanne Leedom-Ackerman
Novelist and journalist, U.S.
Ayo Obe
Chair of Steering Committee of World Movement for Democracy,
Nigeria
Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas
Crisis Group Asia Report N°131, 2 April 2007 Page 27
Christine Ockrent
Journalist and author, France
Victor Pinchuk
Founder of Interpipe Scientific and Industrial Production Group
Samantha Power
Author and Professor, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University
Fidel V. Ramos
Former President of Philippines
Ghassan Salamé
Former Minister, Lebanon; Professor of International Relations, Paris
Douglas Schoen
Founding Partner of Penn, Schoen & Berland Associates, U.S.
Thorvald Stoltenberg
Former Foreign Minister of Norway
Ernesto Zedillo
Former President of Mexico; Director, Yale Center for the Study
of Globalization
INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL
Crisis Group’s International Advisory Council comprises major individual and corporate donors who contribute their advice
and experience to Crisis Group on a regular basis.
Rita E. Hauser (Chair)
Elliott F. Kulick (Deputy Chair)
Marc Abramowitz
Anglo American PLC
APCO Worldwide Inc.
Ed Bachrach
Patrick E. Benzie
Stanley M. Bergman and
Edward J. Bergman
BHP Billiton
Harry Bookey and Pamela
Bass-Bookey
John Chapman Chester
Chevron
Citigroup
Companhia Vale do Rio Doce
Richard H. Cooper
Credit Suisse
John Ehara
Equinox Partners
Frontier Strategy Group
Konrad Fischer
Alan Griffiths
Charlotte and Fred Hubbell
Iara Lee & George Gund III
Foundation
Sheikh Khaled Juffali
George Kellner
Amed Khan
Shiv Vikram Khemka
Scott J. Lawlor
George Loening
McKinsey & Company
Najib A. Mikati
Donald Pels
PT Newmont Pacific Nusantara
(Mr. Robert Humberson)
Michael L. Riordan
Tilleke & Gibbins
Baron Guy Ullens de Schooten
VIVATrust
Stanley Weiss
Westfield Group
Woodside Energy, Ltd
Don Xia
Yasuyo Yamazaki
Yapi Merkezi Construction
and Industry Inc.
Shinji Yazaki
Sunny Yoon
SENIOR ADVISERS
Crisis Group’s Senior Advisers are former Board Members (not presently holding national government executive
office) who maintain an association with Crisis Group, and whose advice and support are called on from time to time.
Martti Ahtisaari
(Chairman Emeritus)
Diego Arria
Paddy Ashdown
Zainab Bangura
Christoph Bertram
Jorge Castañeda
Alain Destexhe
Marika Fahlen
Stanley Fischer
Malcolm Fraser
Bronislaw Geremek
I.K. Gujral
Max Jakobson
Todung Mulya Lubis
Allan J. MacEachen
Barbara McDougall
Matthew McHugh
George J. Mitchell
(Chairman Emeritus)
Surin Pitsuwan
Cyril Ramaphosa
George Robertson
Michel Rocard
Volker Ruehe
Mohamed Sahnoun
Salim A. Salim
William Taylor
Leo Tindemans
Ed van Thijn
Shirley Williams
Grigory Yavlinski
Uta Zapf